














The Impact of Emotional Distress on Cognitive 




















Submitted in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
under the Executive Committee  





























































THE IMPACT OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS ON COGNITIVE 
PERFORMANCE IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
Sarah Bellovin-Weiss 
 
Individuals with borderline personality disorder (BPD) are prone to intense emotional 
reactions and dysfunctional interpersonal relationships, which may be associated with 
disruptions in cognitive functioning. However, research comparing neurocognitive functioning in 
BPD compared to patients with comorbid disorders like MDD and healthy control groups has 
been inconclusive. This study was the first to directly measure BPD individuals‘ working 
memory capacities under stressful conditions, using an experimentally manipulated, in-vivo 
social stressor. The primary aims of this study were to investigate the impact of emotional 
distress on working memory performance in the context of a psychological stress procedure 
(Trier Social Stress Test) and to determine whether emotion-induced working memory disruption 
was stronger for participants with BPD (n = 60) than for participants with MDD (n = 30) or 
healthy controls (n = 21). Results showed that emotional distress positively predicted working 
memory errors in the sample overall, with self-reported feelings of confusion and vigor 
accounting for this relationship. However, there were no basic working memory differences 
between BPD participants, MDD participants, and controls. BPD participants were also not more 
likely to have impairments in working memory as a consequence of emotional distress compared 
to participants with MDD. Participants with BPD were more likely to have had a history of self-
injurious behavior, showed poorer psychosocial functioning, and showed higher levels of 
 
 
depression, anxiety, aggression, and impulsivity. When the effects of emotional distress were 
controlled for, participants with BPD were shown to have superior working memory 
performance, while MDD participants were shown to have poorer working memory 
performance, compared to the sample mean. Findings from the current study underscore the need 
to account for emotional distress when examining working memory in BPD and MDD groups. 
Mood fluctuations and emotional reactivity may play a larger role than pathophysiological 
factors in characterizing neurocognitive performance in these groups. These findings could point 
to a deficit in MDD, perhaps characterized by insufficient reactivity to the mobilizing effects of 
mild stress. Alternatively, BPD individuals‘ greater attunement and sensitivity to others‘ 
emotional states may paradoxically confer an advantage when pure attentiveness and 
concentration are called for. Future research should aim to identify psychological and 
neurocognitive strengths among individuals with BPD. Given the equivocal and complex 
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CHAPTER I:  
INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
The ability to maintain cognitive focus when under stress is of paramount importance in 
daily life, and is central to successful functioning in occupational and social domains. Few 
studies have investigated the impact of emotional distress on cognitive performance in patients 
with borderline personality disorder (BPD), and none have examined this in the context of 
negative evaluation fears and hypersensitivity to rejection. The primary aim of this study was to 
investigate the impact of emotional distress on working memory performance, and to determine 
whether emotion-induced working memory disruption was stronger for participants with BPD 
than for participants with major depressive disorder (MDD) or healthy controls. Our sample was 
drawn from a larger set of patients who participated in a research study at New York State 
Psychiatric Institute (NYSPI).  
As part of their participation in a parent study, all participants underwent a modified 
psychological stress procedure in order to evaluate heart rate reactivity and cortisol levels. Two 
procedures were used to induce psychological stress and were administered by study 
confederates clad in white laboratory coats who displayed neutral affect and gave minimal 
feedback to participants. Participants were first asked to speak about themselves 
extemporaneously for five minutes, followed by four increasingly rapid trials of a working 
memory task in which they were instructed to add a series of single digits in sequence. 
Participants completed mood ratings immediately before and after the procedures, and at follow-
up 25 minutes later. 
As a result of these procedures, it is likely that participants were emotionally distressed 
by the first half of the psychological stress test while they participated in the working memory 
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task. Despite the fact that the purpose of the working memory task in the parent study was to 
induce further psychological stress, the accuracy of participants‘ performance on the working 
memory task could serve as a valuable proxy measure of the ability to regulate emotional 
responsiveness to stress and to allocate cognitive resources to achieve a specific goal—skills 
which are seen as key in BPD-oriented treatment models like dialectical behavior therapy (DBT).  
Because the induction of stress in our study paradigm took place in an interpersonal 
context, participants may have been experiencing the acute sensitivity to rejection and negative 
evaluation that is a hallmark of BPD. In addition, it is unknown based on previous research 
whether patients with BPD experience more severe emotion-induced cognitive disruption than 
patients with other psychiatric disorders, particularly a highly comorbid disorder like MDD. 
Research in this area could help to identify patients who are most vulnerable to cognitive 
disruption and would benefit from focused treatment efforts targeting these deficits.  
Borderline personality disorder 
Borderline personality disorder (BPD) is a chronic and often debilitating psychiatric 
disorder characterized by a pervasive pattern of instability. Key areas of dysfunction include 
mood lability and reactivity; unstable identity and cognitive dysregulation, including paranoid 
ideation and dissociation when under stress; chaotic interpersonal relationships (i.e., intense, 
volatile relationships marked by alternating extremes of idealization and devaluation); and 
difficulties with impulse control and behavioral disinhibition. The disorder has been estimated to 
occur in 1-2% of the general population (Swartz, Blazer, George, & Winfield, 1990; Torgersen, 
Kringlen, & Cramer, 2011), but accounts for a disproportionately high number of patients 
utilizing inpatient psychiatric services (Widiger & Weissman, 1991).  
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One of the core underpinnings of the disorder is a highly sensitive and emotionally 
vulnerable temperament, a feature which manifests itself in a variety of contexts. Notable among 
these is the interpersonal nature of many of the difficulties encountered by these individuals. 
Striking differences have been observed in the phenomenology of suicidal behavior between 
individuals with BPD and those with MDD. For instance, patients with BPD are more likely to 
report feelings of relief and diminished distress after a suicide attempt, while individuals with 
MDD tend to report feelings of regret and no significant change in sadness or distress following 
an attempt (Stanley & Brodsky, 2005). This points to the role of suicidality as a means of affect 
regulation among those with BPD, even in response to stressors which individuals without the 
disorder would find far less troubling. In addition, triggers of suicidal attempts and behavior 
among individuals with BPD are far more likely to be interpersonal, and center around perceived 
abandonments, rejections, slights, and losses (Brodsky, Groves, Oquendo, Mann, & Stanley, 
2006). 
Empirical, clinical, and anecdotal literature has led some to characterize the temperament 
of individuals with BPD as ‗exquisitely‘ sensitive (Stanley & Siever, 2010). An emotionally 
sensitive temperament is characterized by a low threshold for the detection of emotional cues, 
intense responses to emotional stimuli, and a slow return to baseline levels of distress (Linehan, 
1993). That is, individuals with BPD are likely to possess a lower threshold for emotional 
distress and to exhibit stronger responses of longer duration than non-BPD individuals. The early 
invalidation of emotional experiences and insufficient labeling or recognition of emotional states 
are thought to contribute to this constellation of emotion regulation difficulties in BPD (Linehan, 
1993). In addition, emotional sensitivity and impulsivity in childhood may be potentiated by life 
 
4 
experiences and risk factors that further exacerbate emotion regulation problems (Crowell, 
Beauchaine, & Linehan, 2009).  
Emotion regulation 
Emotion regulation refers to the ability to modulate emotional responses to internal or 
environmental stimuli, either through amplification, attenuation, or maintenance of emotional 
states (Gross, 2002). The ability to exercise effective control over emotions involves accessing 
cognitive resources (Ochsner & Gross, 2005), most commonly to engage in cognitive reappraisal 
of emotional stimuli or to recruit behavioral suppression or modification of emotional responses 
once they have already been triggered (Gross, 2002). The selection of particular emotion 
regulation strategies varies widely according to circumstances and individual differences, and 
may include either the ‗up-regulation‘ or ‗down-regulation‘ of emotions (Gross, 1998).  
Due to their pervasive instability and difficulties with emotion regulation, as well as 
chaotic interpersonal relationships, individuals with BPD have difficulty achieving non-mood-
dependent goals and inhibiting behavioral responses to powerful emotional stimuli, resulting in 
an escalation of volatile and emotionally triggering situations (Bohus, Schmahl, & Lieb, 2004). 
The overall capacity to modulate emotional responses and to flexibly adapt one‘s choice of 
appropriate regulation strategies is associated with an array of beneficial psychosocial outcomes, 
including academic achievement (Bandura, Caprara, Barbaranelli, Gerbino, & Pastorelli, 2003), 
prosocial behavior (Eisenberg, Fabes, Guthrie, & Reiser, 2000), social acceptance and likability 
(Eisenberg & Fabes, 1992), and psychological well-being (Gross & John, 2003).  
Neurocognitive functioning in BPD 
While the clinical features of BPD are well-described, there are a wide range of 
explanations as to neurobiological underpinnings of the disorder. Researchers have sought to 
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identify areas of neuropsychological functioning that may be distinct in BPD, both as a means of 
understanding the disorder and to guide targeted treatment efforts. Some studies on 
neurocognitive differences between individuals with BPD and healthy controls have shown 
frontal lobe dysfunction in BPD (Dinn et al., 2004; Ruocco & Trobst, 2003; Tebartz van Elst et 
al., 2003), with specific deficits observed in a range of functions. A meta-analysis (Ruocco, 
2005), for example, examined 10 studies comparing neuropsychological functioning in BPD to 
healthy controls across six domains. Mean weighted effect sizes (Cohen‘s d) by domain were 
large for planning (d = -1.43, SE = 0.20); moderate for attention (d = -0.59, SE – 0.22), speeded 
processing (d = -0.68, SE = 0.14), visuospatial ability (d = -0.59, SE = 0.11), and learning and 
memory (d = -0.66, SE = 0.15), with greater impairments shown for nonverbal memory than for 
verbal memory; and small for cognitive flexibility (-0.29, SE = 0.13).  
The fact that the largest deficit was observed for planning is consistent with the high 
levels of impulsivity found in this population (Links, Heslegrave, & Reekum, 1999), and points 
to potential deficits in executive functioning. Deficits in executive functioning have been found 
in a number of studies comparing participants with BPD to healthy controls. Specific deficits in 
this domain include decision-making and planning (Bazanis et al., 2002; Beblo et al., 2006; 
Black et al., 2009; Haaland & Landro, 2007; LeGris, Links, van Reekum, Tannock, & Toplak, 
2012), response inhibition (Rentrop et al., 2007), and cognitive flexibility and abstraction ability 
(Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Fertuck, & Kernberg, 2004). Visual memory is another frequently 
reported neurocognitive deficit in BPD compared to healthy controls (Beblo, Mensebach, 
Wingenfeld, Rullkoetter, & Schlosser, 2011; Beblo et al., 2006; Harris, Dinn, & Marcinkiewicz, 
2002; Judd & Ruff, 1993; O‘Leary, Brouwers, Gardner, & Cowdry, 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et 
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al., 1993). Deficits in visual memory in BPD participants have been linked to reduced volume in 
the hippocampus (Driessen et al., 2000; Irle, Lange, & Sachsse, 2005).   
Studies examining working memory processes in BPD are of particular significance, 
since working memory requires sustained attention and therefore is particularly vulnerable to 
interference from the intense emotional responses that are characteristic of BPD (Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006). Findings from working memory studies also help to shed light on the 
complexity of neuropsychological functioning in BPD. For example, BPD patients may show 
deficits in accuracy on classic working memory tasks such as the N-Back (Hagenhoff et al., 
2013; Black et al., 2009; Lazzaretti et al., 2012), though it is not clear whether increased 
cognitive load worsens accuracy among these participants (Hagenhoff et al., 2013; Stevens, 
Burkhardt, Hautzinger, Schwarz, & Unckel, 2004). Black et al. (2009) executed a well-controlled 
study which compared BPD participants to controls and found that the BPD group‘s deficits in 
working memory, perseveration, and decision-making were not attributable to the effects of IQ, 
depression, or alcohol use.  
Interestingly, BPD participants may sometimes show faster reaction times compared to 
controls on working memory tasks (Hagenhoff et al., 2013) but potentially at the expense of 
accuracy (Rentrop et al., 2007), resulting in a speed-accuracy tradeoff. However, other studies 
comparing BPD participants to controls in visual working memory have found no evidence for 
such a tradeoff, despite greater impairments in accuracy among the BPD group (Keilp et al., 
2007; Stevens et al., 2004). One potential explanation for accelerated reaction times among BPD 
groups may lie in the relationship between BPD traits and harm avoidance (Ball, Tennen, Poling, 
Kranzler, & Rounsaville, 1997), such that negative emotions actually motivate individuals with 
BPD to avoid punishments and negative consequences. For example, negative affective states 
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have been shown to predict greater impulse control for individuals with BPD traits compared to 
those without BPD traits (Chapman, Leung, & Lynch, 2008). Alternatively, faster reaction times 
in these studies could simply reflect the impulsive response style that is characteristic of 
individuals with BPD, in both clinical and experimental settings (de Bruijn et al., 2006; Haaland 
& Landro, 2007). 
Other studies comparing BPD participants to healthy controls on neurocognitive 
measures have found no differences. Sprock, Rader, Kendall, and Yoder (2000), for example, 
found no differences between groups of BPD participants and controls on measures of memory 
or executive functioning. Other studies have shown impairments for BPD participants in some 
neurocognitive domains but not others. Kunert, Druecke, Sass, and Herpertz (2003) found that 
although individuals with BPD demonstrated poorer planning and greater impulsivity than 
controls, they performed equally well on neuropsychological tests of learning and memory, 
vulnerability to interference, intelligence, and attentiveness. Another study compared global 
executive functioning and working memory capacities among BPD and control participants, and 
found deficits for the BPD group in decision-making but no other executive functioning areas 
(LeGris et al., 2012). Similarly, BPD participants have been shown to demonstrate poorer 
working memory performance, but with no accompanying deficits in sustained attention 
(Lazzaretti et al., 2012).   
Other studies have yielded null findings across a number of neurocognitive domains, 
such as working memory and attention (Dinn et al., 2004; Fertuck et al., 2006b; Lenzenweger et 
al., 2004; Sprock et al., 2000), learning and memory (Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; 
Fertuck et al., 2006b; Bazanis et al., 2002), language abilities (Cornelius et al., 1989), 
intelligence (Fertuck et al., 2006b; Kunert et al., 2003), motor abilities (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
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Fertuck et al., 2006b), visuospatial abilities (Cornelius et al., 1989), processing speed (Fertuck et 
al., 2006b); and executive functioning  (Dinn et al., 2004; Fertuck et al., 2006b; Hagenhoff et al., 
2013).  
Thus, studies comparing neuropsychological functioning in BPD to that of healthy 
controls have yielded mixed results. The influence of confounding variables, such as 
intelligence, has not been adequately addressed in most studies (Fertuck et al., 2006a), with some 
exceptions (Black et al., 2009). Furthermore, it is not known whether observed neurocognitive 
differences represent primary functional deficits, or whether they are better understood as 
transient fluctuations in neurocognitive functioning, owing to the chronic cognitive instability of 
the disorder. In their study of neurocognitive deficits in BPD, Black et al. (2009) evaluated the 
predictive utility of neuropsychological tests compared to personality traits in accounting for the 
variance in BPD and found that although the BPD group showed deficits, neuropsychological 
tests did not improve explained variance over and above personality traits. They suggested that 
even when neuropsychological impairments are found among individuals with BPD, the findings 
may be more attributable to factors such as impulsivity and mood reactivity.  
Impact of emotion on cognitive functioning 
One promising area of inquiry into the neurobiological substrates of BPD is research 
examining the impact of emotionality on cognitive functioning, and how this neural circuitry 
may be different in BPD than in healthy controls. This is particularly important given that the 
extant literature on neurocognitive functioning BPD has yielded equivocal results, such that the 
role of transient mood states and distress may be particularly important.  
Empirical investigations into the neural circuitry of emotion regulation have suggested 
that orbitofrontal regions (Beer, Shimamura, & Knight, 2004) and subgenual cingulate regions 
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(Silbersweig et al., 2007) are involved in the cognitive evaluation of emotional experiences, 
while the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) has been implicated in the executive control of 
responses to emotional stimuli (Johnson, Hurley, Benkelfat, Herpertz, & Taber, 2003). In 
addition, a key feature of emotion regulation is the ability to orient one‘s attention away from 
emotional stimuli when necessary, and to attend selectively to certain aspects of one‘s immediate 
experience but not others (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & Gabrieli, 2003). It has been 
well-documented that emotional stimuli can compete for attentional resources and can interfere 
with complex cognitive functions under some circumstances (Vuilleumier, 2005). In particular, 
researchers have suggested that working memory—the ability to temporarily store and 
manipulate new information (Baddeley, 1992)—is especially vulnerable to interference from 
emotional stimuli, since it requires uninterrupted focus on a particular goal or task (Dolcos & 
McCarthy, 2006).  
Data from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies offer compelling 
evidence for a complex interactional process between cognitive and affective systems, which 
helps to explain why and how emotion interferes with cognitive functions. In one of the only 
imaging studies to examine the neural mechanisms of emotion-induced cognitive disruption, 
Dolcos and McCarthy (2006) suggested that the ventral system of ‗hot‘ emotional processing 
(i.e., the amygdala and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex) interacts with the dorsal system of ‗cold‘ 
executive functioning (i.e., the DLPFC and lateral parietal cortex). Specifically, they found that 
during emotion-based distraction of a cognitive task, activation in the ventral system 
significantly disrupted neural activity in the dorsal executive areas, regions which have been 
shown to correlate with working memory functions (Smith & Jonides, 1999) and with the ability 
to inhibit attention to irrelevant information (Shimamura, 2000).  
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Impact of emotion on cognitive functioning in BPD  
Compared to neutral stimuli, negative emotional stimuli appear to exert a greater 
distracting influence on cognitive control in most individuals (Dolcos & McCarthy, 2006). 
However, because individuals with BPD possess a lower threshold for the detection of emotional 
content and experience more intense emotional reactions, they are likely to experience greater 
cognitive disruption when emotionally primed (Winter, Elzinga, & Schmahl, 2014). In addition, 
the lengthier duration of emotional responses in individuals with BPD delays the return of 
critical thinking and executive functioning, which may prolong their vulnerability to further 
emotionally dysregulating experiences.  
A number of studies have begun to explore the ways in which cognitive resources 
become less available to individuals with BPD in moments of psychological stress, and have 
provided support for the cognitive-affective interaction mechanism described by Dolcos and 
McCarthy (2006). A recent study by Krause-Utz et al. (2012) found that, compared to healthy 
controls, individuals with BPD showed greater activation in the amygdala and reduced neural 
activity in the DLPFC—and exhibited slower reaction times on a working memory task—in 
response to emotionally distressing images. Studies examining components of the interaction 
system separately in BPD patients have implicated reduced prefrontal control or inhibition of 
emotion-induced interference (Domes et al., 2006; Gratz, Rosenthal, Tull, Lejuez, & Gunderson, 
2006; Korfine & Hooley, 2000; Mensebach et al., 2009; Silbersweig et al., 2007) in the dorsal 
system and elevated activity in the amygdala (Donegan et al., 2003; Herpertz et al., 2001; 
Koenigsberg et al., 2009; Minzenberg, Fan, New, Tang, & Siever, 2007) and other limbic 
structures such as the left anterior cingulate cortex (Schnell, Dietrich, Schnitker, Dauman, & 
Herpertz, 2007) in the ventral system. The impact of emotional stimuli on cognitive processing 
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in BPD patients has been found to be related to self-reports of emotional appraisals, such as a 
non-accepting stance toward emotions (Gratz et al., 2006), but may also occur at a nonconscious 
or subliminal level (Arntz, Appels, & Sieswerda, 2000).  
Emotion-induced cognitive disruption in BPD may be mediated by hypervigilance and 
hypersensitivity to rejection. Heightened sensitivity to rejection is a well-known clinical feature 
of BPD (Ayduk et al., 2008; Linehan, 1993; Staebler, Helbing, Rosenbach, & Renneberg, 2011), 
and accompanying feelings of abandonment, loss, and loneliness are highly related to suicide 
attempts and self-injurious behavior in this population (Brodsky et al., 2006; Stiglmayr, Shapiro, 
Stieglitz, Limberger, & Bohus, 2001; Welch & Linehan, 2002). Heightened rejection sensitivity 
in BPD has been linked to greater sensitivity to fearful stimuli (Wagner & Linehan, 1999) as 
well as the tendency to make negative interpretations of otherwise neutral interpersonal stimuli 
(Donegan et al., 2003). This process is associated with hypervigilance in scanning the 
environments for threats (Herpertz et al., 2001), a process which is heavily governed by the 
amygdala and other limbic circuits (Öhman, 2005). Thus, there may be additional strain on 
cognitive resources in individuals with BPD as a result of heightened rejection sensitivity, 
particularly in situations which prime the activation of negative evaluation fears. This process of 
threat detection may become even more vigorous and demand more attentional resources – and 
therefore lead to greater depletion of working memory – when stimuli are ambiguous and subject 
to multiple interpretations, as can occur in social situations.  
Researchers have used various experimental methods to examine the direct impact of 
emotional stimuli on cognitive processes in BPD, most often involving lists of emotionally 
valenced words or images (e.g., Korfine & Hooley, 2000; Mensebach et al., 2009; Silbersweig et 
al., 2007). However, there has been a relative dearth of research examining the impact of direct 
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(i.e., in vivo) interpersonal triggers of emotional distress on cognitive functioning in BPD. 
Individuals with BPD may be especially sensitive to emotional priming in an interpersonal 
context (Berenson et al., 2009). The salience of interpersonal stressors in BPD pathology has 
been well-documented. For example, triggers of suicide attempts among BPD patients are most 
often interpersonal in nature (Brodsky, Groves, Oquendo, Mann, & Stanley, 2006).  
Comorbidity with MDD. Discerning the impact of emotional stimuli on cognitive 
performance in BPD patients is often complicated by the comorbid presence of major depression. 
Indeed, major depressive disorder (MDD) is one of the most common comorbidities observed in 
BPD (Grant et al., 2008; Zanarini et al., 1998). The effects of depressive symptomatology on 
cognitive performance, independently of personality disorders, have received a great deal of 
empirical attention (e.g., Landrø, Stiles, & Sletvold, 2001; Paelecke-Habermann, Pohl, & 
Leplow, 2005). One of the most consistent findings has been a mood-congruence bias for 
memory and attention, in which individuals with MDD are more likely than controls to recall 
information related to negative emotions (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 1996; Bradley, Mogg, & 
Williams, 1995; Direnfeld & Roberts, 2006; Gotlib et al., 2004) and to orient attention toward 
negative emotional cues (Elliott, Zahn, Deakin, & Anderson, 2011; Rinck & Becker, 2005).  
However, disentangling the contributions of Axis I and Axis II pathologies in 
neurocognitive functioning can be difficult (Fertuck et al., 2006a). In addition, some studies have 
shown that observed deficits in neurocognitive functioning among BPD patients do not appear to 
be different than those found in patients with MDD (Veiel, 1997; Zakzanis, Leach, & Kaplan, 
1998), though findings in this area have been mixed. Impairments in visual information 
processing have been shown in MDD patients with comorbid BPD but not in uncomplicated 
MDD (Keilp et al., 2007). However, Beblo et al. (2011) noted that neuropsychological 
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performance on visual learning tasks, including one which included an emotional interference 
paradigm, did not distinguish BPD and MDD groups from one another. One factor which may 
help to explain this difference is that the visual information processing task used in Keilp et al.‘s 
(2007) study was a backward masking paradigm, a design in which impulsivity was associated 
with poorer performance. This again points to the role of impulsivity in differentiating BPD 
participants from MDD participants in neurocognitive functioning.  
In a landmark study, Fertuck et al. (2006b) noted the existence of mixed findings on 
neurocognitive impairments in BPD and sought to determine whether such impairments in BPD 
are primarily due to the influence of comorbid depression or borderline personality traits. They 
compared participants with BPD and comorbid MDD, uncomplicated MDD, and healthy 
controls on neuropsychological measures of attention, memory, working memory, intelligence, 
psychomotor speed, motor skill, and executive functions. Notably, all participants also 
completed mood ratings assessing anxiety, depression, confusion, vigor, fatigue, and anger. 
There were no differences between BPD patients with concurrent MDD and those with 
uncomplicated MDD across all seven domains of neurocognitive performance. Although there 
was a strong relationship between anxiety and neurocognitive performance in both patient 
groups, BPD-MDD participants reported greater past-week distress and had higher levels of 
aggression, impulsivity, anger, and anxiety. Interestingly, controlling for the effects of tension 
and anxiety in the sample actually revealed superior cognitive performance among BPD patients 
compared to those with uncomplicated MDD. The authors suggested that anxiety may have a 
larger impact on neuropsychological functioning in BPD than in MDD. Moreover, since 
intellectual functioning was measured in the study, they were able to rule out the possibility that 
the BPD-MDD group was simply more intelligent. Rather, they noted that ―depression-like 
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deficits in BPD participants may be more closely related to characteristic mood fluctuations than 
to the effects of depression per se‖ (Fertuck et al., 2006b, p. 65).  
Summary of existing research 
 Research examining neurocognitive functioning in BPD has struggled to yield consistent 
findings across domains and across samples. One explanation for this might be that few studies 
have accounted for the role of transient mood states and momentary distress in neurocognitive 
performance in BPD. In Fertuck et al.‘s study (2006b), emotional distress had a differential 
impact on the neuropsychological performance of depressed participants with and without BPD, 
such that the BPD-MDD group showed superior performance when distress was held constant. 
This indicates that distress must be accounted for to obtain a meaningful estimate of 
neuropsychological functioning in BPD.  
A growing number of studies, then, have examined cognitive disruption from 
experimentally-induced emotion dysregulation in patients with BPD, and some have examined 
stress responses to interpersonal triggers. However, none have examined cognitive performance 
in the context of negative evaluation fears and hypersensitivity to rejection. Given that 
vulnerability to intense emotional experiences and hypersensitivity to rejection are core features 
of BPD, it is likely that, compared to MDD participants and controls, participants with BPD 
would experience stronger emotional distress following a psychological stress procedure, and 
that this emotional response would be associated with intensified cognitive impairment. 
In the current study, we sought to address gaps in the existing literature in two important 
ways. First, we evaluated performance on a working memory task administered in the context of 
a psychological stress procedure among BPD participants with or without comorbid MDD, MDD 
participants with no comorbid BPD, and healthy controls.  The psychological stress procedure 
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required participants to give a short speech and perform the working memory task in front of two 
study confederates, who wore white laboratory coats and showed no affect nor provided any 
facial feedback. Given BPD individuals‘ heightened sensitivity to rejection, as well as their 
tendency to deplete cognitive resources by assessing neutral stimuli for potential threats or 
rejection cues, we expected that this stress paradigm would result in elevated levels of distress 
and derail their cognitive functioning to a greater extent than would the more impersonal stimuli 
that have been used in previous studies, such as words and images.  
Second, as has been previously discussed, neurocognitive functioning in BPD may owe 
more to transient mood states and distress levels than to primary deficits per se. Accounting for 
the effects of distress may therefore be critical in allowing neurocognitive differences to emerge 
between BPD participants and MDD or control groups, as was found in Fertuck et al.‘s study 
(2006b). Because participants in our psychological stress procedure underwent the working 
memory task while under stress, we could therefore account for the impact of stress on 
participants‘ cognitive performance. 
Aims and Hypotheses 
Aim 1:  To examine working memory performance in the context of a psychological 
stress procedure. 
Hypothesis 1a: BPD participants will show significantly poorer working memory 
performance compared to MDDs and controls. A one-way ANOVA comparing BPD, MDD, and 
control participants on working memory performance will reveal significant differences across 
groups. Post-hoc tests will show that BPD participants‘ working memory performance was 
significantly poorer than MDDs‘ and controls‘. 
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Hypothesis 1b: Participants with MDD will show significantly better working memory 
performance compared to participants with BPD. Post-hoc tests will show that MDD 
participants‘ working memory performance was significantly better than BPDs‘. Based on the 
existing literature (e.g., Keilp et al., 2010), it is difficult to predict how MDD participants will 
perform on the working memory task compared to controls. 
Hypothesis 1c: The impact of diagnosis on working memory performance will be 
mediated by emotional distress. When emotional distress is included in a regression of working 
memory performance onto diagnostic category, the association between working memory 
performance and diagnosis will weaken. 
Aim 2:  To examine the impact of emotional distress on working memory performance. 
 
 Hypothesis 2a: Higher levels of emotional distress post-procedure will be associated with 
greater number of errors on the working memory task. Pearson correlation coefficients showing 
the strength of association between emotional distress and number of errors on the working 
memory task will be positive and significant. 
 Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between emotional distress post-procedure and working 
memory performance will be stronger for BPD participants than for healthy controls. A z-test 
comparing Pearson correlation coefficients for working memory performance and emotional 
distress among BPD participants and healthy controls will be significant. In addition, diagnosis 
will moderate the relationship between emotional distress and working memory performance, 
such that emotional distress will be shown to have a larger impact on working memory for BPD 
participants than for controls. 
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CHAPTER II:  
METHOD 
Participants 
 This study was a secondary data analysis. Study participants were a subset (n = 118) of a 
larger study conducted at New York State Psychiatric Institute (PI: Barbara Stanley, Ph.D.). This 
parent study was a prospective, naturalistic examination of biological and clinical predictors of 
suicidal behavior. The parent sample was comprised of 100 participants with BPD (50 suicide 
attempters and 50 non-attempters), a psychiatric control group of 100 participants with MDD and 
no Axis II disorder (50 suicide attempters and 50 non- attempters), and 50 healthy controls with 
no current or past Axis I or Axis II diagnoses. Male and female clinical participants were eligible 
to participate in the parent study if they had a diagnosis of either MDD or BPD, were between 
the ages of 18 and 55, and were able and willing to provide informed consent. Clinical 
participants were excluded from participation if they exhibited organic mental syndromes, 
current psychoactive substance dependence, or mental retardation; schizophrenia, schizoaffective 
disorder, delusional disorder, or any other psychotic disorder; or history of vasovagal syncope, 
heart disease, or myocardial infarction. Healthy controls were eligible to participate in the parent 
study if they were between the ages of 18 and 55, had no current or past Axis I or Axis II 
disorders, had no alcohol or substance use disorder within the last three months, did not take any 
medications, and were able and willing to provide informed consent.  
  Participants whose data were eligible for analysis in the current study were males and 
females between the ages of 18 and 55 who did not meet any of the above exclusion criteria. For 
inclusion in the current study, participants also had to have participated in psychological stress 
test procedures at baseline (described in ―Procedure‖). Participants with a primary diagnosis of 
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BPD (n = 60) were compared to patients with MDD (n =30) as a psychiatric control group and to 
healthy controls (n = 21). Modifications to the sample used for analysis are described in 
―Statistical Analysis.‖ 
Measures  
Working memory. Working memory was assessed using the PASAT-C. The PASAT 
was originally designed as a neuropsychological assessment of auditory processing speed, 
flexibility, and general working memory in patients with traumatic brain injury (Gronwall, 
1977). The task has been used to study the impact of various conditions on cognitive functioning, 
such as multiple sclerosis (Benedict et al., 2002), lupus (Shucard et al, 2004), and chronic fatigue 
syndrome (Tombaugh, 2006). The PASAT involves the rapid presentation of a series of single-
digit numbers, in which the two most recent digits must be summed. For example, if the digits 
‗2‘, ‗8‘, and ‗5‘ were presented, the correct sums would be ‗10‘ and then ‗13.‘ It is noteworthy 
that participants must ignore the first sum to recall the second digit in the sequence and add it to 
the next one, thereby contributing to the task‘s difficulty. Participants must provide the correct 
sum before the next digit in the series is presented in order for the response to be scored.  
Although digits were presented auditorily in the original version of the task, many recent 
studies have used visually presented digits on computer screens (e.g., Fos, Greve, South, 
Mathias, & Benefield, 2000; Royan, Tombaugh, Rees, & Francis, 2004; Tombaugh, Rees, Baird, 
& Kost, 2004). While some studies have employed consistent latency intervals between digits, 
most have used increasingly rapid inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs; e.g., Tombaugh et al., 2004). 
Tombaugh‘s (2006) comparison of these studies indicated that the most rapid ISIs are less 
sensitive to the detection of between-group differences.  
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Factor analytic studies have indicated that the PASAT measures components of working 
memory. Specifically, the task has been shown to measure attention switching (Bate, Mathias, & 
Crawford, 2001), divided attention (van Zomeran & Brouwer, 1994), mental tracking (Lezak, 
1995), concentration (Gronwall & Wrightson, 1981), speed of information processing (Haslam, 
Batchelor, Fearnside, Haslam, & Hawkins, 1995), immediate memory (Larrabee & Curtiss, 
1995), and a latent factor termed Freedom from Distractibility (Crawford et al., 1998; Deary et 
al, 1991; Sherman et al., 1995). More recently, researchers have suggested that successful 
performance on the PASAT draws on several simultaneous cognitive abilities, most notably 
sustained attention and speed of information processing (Cicerone, 1997; Madigan et al., 2000). 
Studies have demonstrated moderate to high correlations between the PASAT and other 
measures of working memory components, particularly attention; these include Digit Span (r = 
.27 to .49; Fisk & Archibald, 2001), Trails (r = .58; O‘Donnell, MacGregor, Dabrowski, 
Oestreicher, & Romero, 1994), and Arithmetic (r = .63; Crawford et al., 1998). The PASAT has 
been shown to possess a high degree of internal consistency, with Cronbach‘s alphas ranging 
from .76 to .95 (MacLeod & Prior, 1996; Ponsford & Kinsella, 1992; Sherman et al., 1997); test-
retest coefficients have ranged from .90 to .97 (McCaffrey, Westervelt, & Haase, 2001; Stuss et 
al., 1989).  
Researchers have long encountered difficulties administering the PASAT, particularly in 
clinical populations (Iverson, Lovell, & Smith, 2000), due to the task‘s high level of difficulty 
and aversive nature (e.g., Diehr et al, 2003). Participants have reported elevated levels of anxiety 
(Roman, Edwall, Buchanan, & Patton, 1991), sadness (Holdwick & Wingenfeld, 1999), and 
stress (Stuss, Stethem, Hugenholtz, & Richard, 1989) after performing the task. Accordingly, the 
PASAT was adapted by Lejuez, Kahler, and Brown (2003) for use as an experimental induction 
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of moderate psychological stress rather than a neuropsychological assessment. Lejuez et al. 
(2003) adapted the PASAT for use as a stress induction tool by giving unpleasant auditory 
feedback when incorrect answers were given, and by increasing precision through computerized 
measurements of inter-stimulus interval times and participant errors. In their pilot study of this 
modified, computerized version of the task (PASAT-C), it was shown to induce self-reported 
anxiety, difficulty concentrating, and irritability (Lejuez et al., 2003).  
Researchers have adapted the PASAT-C further (Keilp et al, 2010) to incorporate it into 
the Trier Social Stress Test (TSST; Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993), a standardized 
social stress procedure which in turn has been modified for use in clinical populations and was 
used in the parent study (described in ―Procedure‖). Participants in the parent study were 
administered the PASAT-C for the purposes of inducing psychological stress. However, given 
the long history and well-validated use of the PASAT as a neuropsychological measure, 
participants‘ actual performance (measured by total number of errors) on the PASAT-C was used 
as the dependent variable in the current study to examine the ability to sustain working memory 
abilities while under stress. The total number of errors was summed from errors made on each of 
four trials. Digits were presented with ISIs of 2.6 seconds in Trial 1, 2.4 seconds in Trial 2, 2.0 
seconds in Trial 3, and 1.6 seconds in Trial 4. Change scores (Trial 1 errors subtracted from Trial 
4 errors) were calculated to estimate deterioration of performance from Trial 1 to Trial 4.  
Distress. The Profile of Mood States (POMS; McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1981) was 
used to assess subjective mood and levels of emotional distress at three time-points: 10 minutes 
before (pre-TSST), immediately following (post-TSST), and 20 minutes after (follow-up) the 15-
minute psychological stress procedure.  The POMS is a 65-item self-report measure which 
assesses subjective experiences across six domains (tension/anxiety, depression/dejection, 
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anger/hostility, confusion/bewilderment, fatigue/inertia, and vigor/activity). All subscales except 
vigor are negatively scaled, with higher scores indicating greater distress. Participants are 
presented with a list of 65 words that describe various feelings and are asked to indicate how 
well the words describe how they have been feeling during the past week, including today. Items 
are scored on a 5-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 (―Not at all‖) to 4 (―Extremely‖). Sample 
words include ―angry‖, ―peeved‖, and ―grouchy‖ for the anger subscale; ―confused‖ and ―unable 
to concentrate‖ for confusion; ―unhappy‖, ―sorry for things done‖, and ―sad‖ for depression; 
―worn out‖, ―listless‖, and ―fatigued‖ for fatigue; ―tense‖, ―shaky‖, and ―on edge‖ for tension; 
and ―lively‖, ―active‖, and ―energetic‖ for vigor. A total distress score is obtained by summing 
scores from the tension, depression, anger, confusion, and fatigue scales, and then subtracting 
scores on the vigor scale. The POMS has been shown to possess good internal consistency 
(Cronbach‘s alpha of .78 to .92; Morfield, Petersen, Kruger-Bodeker, von Mackensen, & 
Bullinger, 2007).  
Participant experience. Participants‘ experiences of the TSST were measured by visual 
analog scales (VAS) administered immediately following the completion of the psychological 
stress test (post-TSST). Participants were asked to rate their experience of the psychological 
stress procedure by indicating on a horizontal continuum their level of stress and concern during 
the task, as well as perceived difficulty of the task and their level of involvement in the task. 
VAS scores are participants‘ marks on the scales, which are measured in millimeters from 0 to 
100.  
Diagnosis. Structured diagnostic interviews, along with a battery of clinical assessments, 
were administered over two to three baseline visits prior to beginning study procedures. Axis I 
diagnoses were ascertained using the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders 
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(SCID-I; First, Gibbon, Spitzer, & Williams, 1996), a clinician-administered instrument designed 
for differential diagnosis of DSM-IV psychiatric disorders. The SCID-I has been shown to 
possess good interrater reliability, with mean Cohen‘s kappas ranging from 0.57 (Zanarini et al., 
2000) to 0.71 (Lobbestael, Leurgans, & Arntz, 2011). Axis II diagnoses were ascertained using 
the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis II Personality Disorders (SCID-II; First, 
Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & Benjamin, 1997). The SCID-II is a clinician-administered 
instrument which has been shown to possess good interrater reliability (.48 to .98) and 
satisfactory internal consistency coefficients, or ICCs (.71 to .94; Maffei et al., 1997).  
In the parent and current study, BPD participants were classified as having an Axis II 
diagnosis of borderline personality disorder, regardless of the presence or absence of current or 
lifetime major depressive disorder. MDD participants were classified as having a current or 
lifetime diagnosis of major depressive disorder, and no diagnosis of BPD. Healthy controls were 
classified as having no current or lifetime Axis I or Axis II diagnosis.  
Clinical symptoms. Clinical symptoms were included for analysis to compare and fully 
characterize the BPD and MDD participant groups, but were not included in primary analyses of 
working memory. Clinical measures assessed global psychosocial functioning using the Global 
Assessment Scale (GAS; American Psychiatric Association, 2000); symptoms of depression 
using the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D; Hamilton, 1960) and Beck Depression 
Inventory (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996); anxiety, using the Hamilton Anxiety Rating 
Scale (HAM-A; Hamilton, 1959) and State-Trait Anxiety Inventory, State Version (STAI; 
Spielberger, 1983); aggression, using the Brown-Goodwin Lifetime History of Aggression 
(BGHA; Brown, Goodwin, Ballenger, Goyer, & Major, 1979); hopelessness, using the Beck 
Hopelessness Scale (BHS; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974); general psychiatric 
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(particularly psychotic) symptoms using the Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS; Overall & 
Gorham, 1962); and impulsivity, using the Barratt Impulsivity Scale (BIS; Patton, & Stanford, & 
Barratt, 1995).  
Procedure 
 Patients were referred to the parent study by referrals from physicians, emergency rooms, 
and state hospitals, and through advertising across the New York City area by direct mailings, in-
service presentations, public affairs programming, and phone contact with local psychiatric 
facilities. Interested patients were informed about the study using a standardized telephone script. 
Participants received initial screenings for eligibility and underwent informed consent 
procedures. Baseline clinical assessments were conducted prior to the psychological stress 
procedure, at the same or a previous visit. The parent study was entitled ―Prospective Study of 
Predictors of Suicidal Behavior in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD)—Biological 
Measures‖ and was approved by the NYSPI-Columbia University Department of Psychiatry 
Institutional Review Board (IRB). Given that the current study was a secondary data analysis and 
involved no new recruitment of subjects, it was considered exempt from committee review by 
the Teachers College IRB.  
The psychological stress procedure used in the parent study was a version of the TSST, a 
tool which has been used extensively to study biobehavioral responses to stress in a laboratory 
setting. This task has also been modified for high-risk populations (Keilp et al., 2010). 
Traditionally, the TSST consists of a 10-minute anticipation period and a 10-minute test period. 
During the test period, participants are asked to stand in front of a microphone and deliver a 
persuasive five-minute speech as a job applicant, followed by performing rapid mental arithmetic 
(such as subtracting serial sevens) in front of an audience of study confederates. The TSST has 
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been shown to reliably induce psychological stress (Nater et al., 2010; Simeon, Knutelska, 
Smith, Baker, & Hollander, 2007; Takahashi et al., 2004). Studies have suggested that the TSST 
induces psychological stress primarily by elevating participant concerns about social evaluation 
and by exposing participants to a task that is uncontrollable (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; 
Gruenewald, Kemeny, Aziz, & Fahey, 2004). 
The version of the TSST which was modified for clinical populations and used in the 
parent study consisted of a five-minute speaking exercise and a 10-minute working memory task 
(PASAT-C), both of which were administered in the presence of two study confederates clad in 
white laboratory coats who displayed neutral affect. This was intended to induce socially 
evaluative stress. The TSST was administered at the same time of day (the afternoon) for all 
participants to minimize the effects of normal diurnal fluctuations in cortisol levels and heart 
rate. Ten minutes before the beginning of the stress procedure, heart rate monitors were placed 
on participants‘ wrists and participants completed mood (POMS) ratings; they also received 
training in the PASAT-C task. One minute before the procedure, participants were asked to stand 
and were informed that they would remain standing for the duration of the task. In the first part 
of the stress procedure, participants were asked to speak about themselves extemporaneously for 
five minutes. In the second half of the stress procedure, participants were administered the 
PASAT-C working memory task. In this version of the PASAT-C, participants stood in front of a 
laptop computer. Series of single digits were presented visually on the screen and participants 
were to mentally sum the two most recent digits, and speak their answers aloud. The PASAT-C 
was administered four times, with the ISI becoming shorter in each trial (2.6, 2.4, 2.0, and 1.6 
seconds, respectively). Participants‘ spoken responses were recorded on clipboards by an 
examiner and a study confederate. Both the examiner and the confederate scored the PASAT. 
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Immediately following the TSST, participants completed distress ratings (POMS) and 
visual analog ratings of their perceived involvement in, difficulty of, concern about, and 
stressfulness of the TSST. They repeated POMS ratings 25 minutes later. If participants reported 
feeling distressed by the procedure, they were given the opportunity to speak with a licensed 









Clinical assessments and study procedures were performed either by licensed 
psychologists or trained research assistants. All interviewers are required to have completed 
ethics training and have had experience working with clinical populations. Clinical interviewers 
who did not have a doctorate degree were supervised closely by a licensed psychologist.  
Statistical Analysis 
All statistical analyses were performed using SPSS (version 17.0). Data was available for 
185 individuals who participated in the parent study. Cases were then eliminated (n = 25) if they 
demonstrated an error rate of greater than 50% (≥ 124 errors) in total PASAT scores, as this 
would indicate that they were no longer attending to the task and providing reliable data. Clinical 
characteristics of participants who prematurely ended the task were explored. Participants who 
ended the task prematurely had fewer years of education than those who completed the task 
(F(1,131) = 13.02, p < .001). They also showed higher baseline levels of clinician-rated anxiety 
(F(1,127) = 4.08, p = .045), were less involved in the task (F(1,141) = 14.13, p < .001), and 
perceived the task as being more difficult (F(1,141) = 5.17, p = .025) than those who completed 
the task. PASAT completers were no more likely than non-completers to have a BPD diagnosis 
(χ
2
(2) = 1.712, p = .425).  
Forty-two participants had missing PASAT data on all four trials and were also removed 
from the sample. This resulted in a final sample of 118 participants, of whom 60 had a diagnosis 
of BPD, 30 had a diagnosis of MDD, and 21 were healthy controls. There were an additional 
seven participants whose diagnostic information was not available. Data elimination procedures 








The sample used for analysis in the current study (n = 118) was evaluated for normality 
using SPSS Regression and Explore functions. Hypotheses were examined using a combination 
of Pearson correlations, chi-squares, one-way ANOVAs, and multiple regression analyses. To 
test the main hypothesis that the impact of emotional distress on working memory is moderated 
by diagnosis, several multiple regression analyses were used (described in ―Results‖). 
Assumptions of linearity, independence of residuals, and homoscedasticity in the multiple 
regression analyses were not violated. To avoid potential problems of multicollinearity with the 
interaction term, mean-subtracted (centered) continuous predictor variables were used (Aiken & 
West, 1991) and multiplicative interaction terms were created. 
Effects coding was used to create two contrast variables for the three diagnostic groups 
(BPD, MDD, and control) in order to test for between-group differences. The first contrast 
variable (BPD = 1, MDD = 0, control = -1) compared BPD participants and controls to the grand 
mean of the sample. The second contrast variable (BPD = 1, MDD = -1, control = 0) compared 
BPD participants and MDD participants to the grand mean of the sample. Probabilities reported 
are two-tailed and significance was established at p < .05. Trends were reported at p < .10.  
CHAPTER III:  
RESULTS 
Descriptive statistics. The mean age of the sample was 32.66 years (SD = 10.49) with a 
range from ages 18 to 57. Participants in the sample had 15.20 years of education on average (SD 
= 2.38). Seventy-eight percent of the sample was female. Approximately 45% of the sample was 
employed. There were slight differences in race across diagnostic groups (χ2 (10) = 17.135, p = 
.071).; z-tests examining column proportions revealed that there was a slightly higher prevalence 
of black participants and lower prevalence of white participants in the MDD group than in the 
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BPD group. MDD participants had slightly fewer years of education than BPD participants or 
controls (F(2,101) = 3.05, p = .052). Among categories of marital status, the BPD participants 
were slightly more likely to be married, while MDD participants were slightly more likely to be 
separated or widowed (χ2 (8) = 13.491, p = .096). However, there were no significant differences 





Table 1. Demographic Characteristics 
 
BPD (n = 60) MDD (n = 30) Control (n = 21) Total (n = 111) 
 ANOVA or  
Pearson Chi-Square   
 M (SD) or n (%) M (SD) or n (%) M (SD) or n (%) M (SD) or n (%)  Test p 
        
Age 32.22 (9.66) 33.00 (10.03) 32.67 (11.87) 32.66 (10.49)  F(2,106) = 0.060 .942 
Sex      
χ2 (2) = 3.888 .143 Male 8 (13.3%) 8 (28.6%) 6 (28.6%) 22 (18.6%)  
Female 52 (86.7%) 20 (71.4%) 15 (71.4%) 92 (78.0%)  
Race/ 
Ethnicity 
   
 
 
χ2 (10) = 17.135 .071 
Asian 3 (5.0%) 1 (3.6%) 2 (9.5%) 6 (5.5%)  
Black 5 (8.3%) 8 (28.6%) 5 (23.8%) 18 (16.5%)  
White 41 (68.3%) 10 (35.7%) 13 (61.9%) 64 (58.7%)  
Hispanic 6 (10.0%) 3 (10.7%) 0 (0.0%) 9 (8.3%)  
Multiracial 1 (1.7%) 2 (7.1%) 1 (4.8%) 4 (3.7%)  
Unknown 4 (6.7%) 4 (14.3%) 0 (0.0%) 8 (7.3%)  
Years of 
education  
15.25 (2.42) 14.46 (2.42) 16.10 (1.45) 15.20 (2.38)  F(2,101) = 3.049 .052 
Marital 
status 
   
 
 
χ2 (8) = 13.491 .096 




12 (20.0%) 1 (3.6%) 1 (4.8%) 
14 (11.9%) 
 
Separated 1 (1.7%) 2 (7.1%) 0 (0%) 4 (3.4%)  
Divorced 8 (13.3%) 3 (10.7%) 1 (4.8%) 12 (10.2%)  
Widowed 0 (0%) 1 (3.6%) 0 (0%) 1 (0.8%)  
Currently 
employed 
   
 
 
χ2 (2) = 4.197 .123 
Yes 24 (40.7%) 13 (48.1%) 14 (66.7%) 53 (44.9%)  




Note. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. a 17 of the 59 participants (28.8%) classified as unemployed were students. 
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Clinical characteristics. To fully characterize our sample, chi-squares and one-way 
ANOVAs were used to analyze differences across diagnostic groups on baseline clinical 
measures collected in the parent study but not incorporated for further analysis in the present 
study.  Significant differences were observed in participants‘ number of comorbid diagnoses 
across the two groups (χ2 (3) = 9.045, p = .029), with BPD participants being more likely to 
carry three or more Axis I diagnoses. BPD participants were also more likely to have had a 
history of self-injurious behavior (χ2 (1) = 7.236, p = .007) and they demonstrated lower GAS 
scores (F(1,84) = 4.99, p = 0.28). In addition, compared to MDD participants, BPD participants 
had higher scores on depression measures; however, only scores on the clinician-rated measure 
of depression (F(1,86) = 4.360, p = .040) were significant; self-reported depression (F(1,84) = 
2.412, p = .124) was not. BPD participants also showed higher levels of anxiety compared to 
MDD participants. In contrast to the depression findings, however, only self-reported anxiety 
(F(1,83) = 10.688, p = .002) was significant, while clinician-rated anxiety (F(1,78) = 1.806, p = 
.183) was not. BPD participants showed higher levels of aggression (F(1,77) = 6.636, p = .012), 
greater overall psychiatric symptoms (F(1,71) = 5.307, p = .024), and higher levels of 
impulsivity (F (1,82) = 14.119, p < .001). There were no other significant differences on clinical 
measures across diagnostic groups. These data are presented in Table 2. The prevalence of 





Table 2. Clinical Characteristics 
 BPD (n = 60) MDD (n = 30)  ANOVA/Pearson Chi-Square 
 




      
Number of comorbid Axis I disorders    
χ2 (3) = 9.045 .029*
a
 
None (0) 2 (3.3%) 1 (3.4%)  
One (1) 17 (28.3%) 14 (48.3%)  
Two (2) 27 (45.0%) 14 (48.3%)  
Three or more (≥ 3) 14 (23.3%) 0 (0%)  
Age of first hospitalization  23.64 (7.73) 18.75 (6.07)  F (1,34) = 2.706 .109 
Number of previous hospitalizations 4.07 (5.41) 3.00 (1.85)  F (1,34) = 0.298 .588 
Total cumulative months in hospital  2.76 (4.78) 4.28 (14.88)  F (1,47) = 0.290 .593 
Physical abuse    
χ2 (1) = 0.299 .584 
Yes 20 (33.3%) 8 (27.6%)  
Sexual abuse    
χ2 (1) = 0.113 .736 
Yes 25 (41.7%) 11 (37.9%)  
Lethality of suicide attempts 2.45 (1.06) 3.10 (1.73)  F (1,37) = 2.012 .164 
History of self-injurious behavior    
χ2 (1) = 7.236 .007** 
Yes 28 (65.1%) 7 (30.4%)  
Functioning (GAS) 57.84 (8.71) 62.03 (7.45) 1-100
b
 F (1,84) = 4.99 .028* 
Depression (HAM-D 24) 15.19 (7.59) 11.60 (7.74) 0-74 F (1,86) = 4.360 .040* 
Depression (BDI-II) 18.52 (9.51) 14.93 (11.40) 0-63 F (1,84) = 2.412 .124 
Anxiety (HAM-A) 10.36 (6.09) 8.50 (5.824) 0-56 F (1,78) = 1.806 .183 
Anxiety (STAI) 51.68 (15.59) 40.69 (12.74) 20-80 F (1,83) = 10.688 .002** 
Aggression (BGHA) 21.10 (5.54) 17.73 (5.81) 11-44 F (1,77) = 6.636 .012* 
Hopelessness (BHS) 9.20 (5.72) 7.41 (5.32) 0-20 F (1,80) = 1.860 .176 
Psychiatric symptoms (BPRS) 28.98 (5.58) 25.97 (5.36) 18-126 F (1,71) = 5.307 .024* 
Impulsivity (BIS) 63.04 (18.49) 48.33 (14.50) 30-120 F (1,82) = 14.119 <.001*** 
      
Note. GAS – Global Assessment Scale; HAM-D 24 – Hamilton Depression Rating Scale, 24 Item; BDI-II – Beck Depression 
Inventory; HAM-A – Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale; STAI – State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (State Form); BGHA – Brown-Goodwin 
Assessment for Lifetime History of Aggression; BHS – Beck Hopelessness Scale; BIS – Barratt Impulsiveness Scale.  
 
a
Bonferroni-corrected contrast: BPD > MDD, three or more Axis I disorders. 
b
 Lower scores indicate poorer functioning. 
 





Table 3. Prevalence of comorbid psychiatric disorders among clinical participants 
 





 Lifetime Current Lifetime Current Lifetime 
Mood disorder       
Major depression 30 (50.0%) 27 (45.0%) 11 (36.7%) 26 (86.7%) 41 (45.6%) 53 (58.9%) 
Dysthymia 5 (8.3%) 4 (6.6%) 2 (6.7%) 2 (6.7%) 7 (7.8%) 6 (6.7%) 
Bipolar disorder 3 (5.0%) -- -- -- 3 (3.3%) -- 
Other bipolar disorder 1 (1.7%) 3 (5.0%) -- -- 1 (0.8%) 3 (2.5%) 
Mood disorder in 
remission 
11 (18.3%) -- 16 (53.3%) -- 27 (30.0%) -- 
Anxiety disorder       
Panic 3 (5.0%) 2 (3.3%) 2 (6.7%) 2 (6.7%) 5 (4.2%) 4 (4.4%) 
Agoraphobia 3 (5.0%) -- -- -- 3 (2.5%) -- 
Social phobia 2 (3.3%) -- -- -- 2 (1.7%) -- 
Simple phobia 4 (6.7%) 3 (5.0%) 1 (3.3%) 2 (6.7%) 5 (4.2%) 5 (4.2%) 
OCD 6 (10.0%) 1 (1.7%) -- -- 6 (5.1%) 1 (0.8%) 
GAD 3 (5.0%) 1 (1.7%) -- -- 3 (2.5%) 1 (0.8%) 
PTSD 3 (5.0%) 8 (13.3%) 2 (6.7%) 3 (10.0%) 5 (4.2%) 11 (12.1%) 
Eating disorder       
Bulimia nervosa 1 (1.7%) 3 (5.0%) -- 1 (3.3%) -- -- 
Binge eating disorder -- 1 (1.7%) 1 (3.3%) 1 (3.3%) 1 (0.8%) 2 (1.7%) 
Personality disorder     
Borderline 60 (100%) -- 60 (66.7%) 
Paranoid 7 (11.7%) 2 (6.7%) 9 (9.9%) 
Schizotypal 5 (8.3%) -- 5 (5.5%) 
Schizoid -- 1 (3.3%) 1 (0.8%) 
OCPD 6 (10.0%) 4 (13.3%) 10 (11.0%)  
Avoidant 9 (15.0%) 4 (13.3%) 13 (14.3%) 
Antisocial -- 1 (3.3%) 1 (0.8%) 
Note. Percentage sums less than 100% were due to missing data. Percentage sums greater than 100% were due to the presence of 




Preliminary analyses. Psychometric properties of independent and dependent variable 
measures are presented in Table 4. This table design was adapted from Shoum (2011). Values for 
kurtosis (-0.83, SE = 0.44) and skewness (0.09, SE = 0.22) in the distribution of the dependent 
variable (PASAT errors) in the total sample were converted to z-scores by dividing by their 
standard errors in order to examine their statistical significance. Absolute values of both z-scores 
fell below the 95% critical value of 1.96, suggesting that skewness and kurtosis in PASAT errors 
did not deviate significantly from the normal curve. Although skewness and kurtosis were high 
for PASAT Trial 1, this suggests that most participants performed fairly well on the easiest trial 
of the task, which is consistent with the test‘s intended design. Closer examination of total 
PASAT errors by diagnostic group using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test revealed normal 
distributions for BPD participants (D(60) = 0.89, p = .20), MDD participants (D(30) = 0.064, p = 
.20) and controls (D(21) =  0.103, p = .20). Levene‘s test revealed homogeneous variances in 
PASAT errors across diagnostic groups (F(2,108) = 0.92, p = .402). Frequencies, histograms, 






Table 4. Psychometric properties of working memory and emotional distress measures 
 
      Range Skewness Kurtosis 
 n M SE SD α Potential Actual Statistic SE Statistic SE 
Working memory 
(PASAT) 
           
Trial 1 (2.6 s) 118 8.37 0.78 8.50 
.87 
0-60 0-49 1.94 0.22 5.04 0.44 
Trial 2 (2.4 s) 118 10.00 0.66 7.18 0-60 0-35 0.66 0.22 0.08 0.44 
Trial 3(2.0 s) 118 14.89 0.84 9.12 0-60 0-34 0.10 0.22 -1.10 0.44 
Trial 4 (1.6 s) 118 21.86 1.00 10.87 0-60 0-49 -0.23 0.22 -0.63 0.44 
Total errors 118 55.12 2.80 30.44 0-240
a
 2-123 0.09 0.22 -0.83 0.44 
Emotional 
distress (POMS) 
           
Pre-TSST 106 26.30 3.96 40.80 .94 -32-228 -30-178 1.16 0.24 1.26 0.47 
Post-TSST 110 36.27 4.25 44.55 .95 -32-228 -31-186 1.01 0.24 0.81 0.46 
Follow-up 109 12.93 3.02 31.50 .94 -32-228 -32-119 1.03 0.23 0.77 0.46 
Visual analog 
scales 
           
Involvement 118 81.33 1.70 18.50 
.62 
0-100 15-100 -1.64 0.23 2.67 0.44 
Stress 118 65.85 2.37 26.03 0-100 2-100 -0.73 0.22 -0.48 0.44 
Concern 118 62.51 2.92 31.75 0-100 0-100 -0.62 0.22 -1.01 0.44 
Difficulty 118 63.08 2.26 24.54 0-100 2-100 -0.68 0.22 -0.27 0.44 
Note. PASAT – Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task; POMS – Profile of Mood States; α = Cronbach‘s alpha. 
 
a 
Cases were excluded from analysis if they had error rates of greater than 50% (≥ 124 errors) in total PASAT scores, as this would 
indicate that they were no longer attending to the task and providing reliable data. Thus, the highest possible PASAT score in this 




Analyses of skewness revealed positive skew for the POMS measures, indicating that 
scores clustered on the lower end of the distribution, and negative skew for the visual analog 
scales, indicating that scores clustered on the higher end of the distribution. Skewness presents 
greater difficulty when tests are norm-referenced, and may even be desirable when the test 
references a criterion rather than a norm (Brown, 1996). In this case, significant negative 
skewness for participants‘ involvement in the TSST indicates a relatively high degree of 
involvement in the task, lending greater validity to the working memory data obtained. Similarly, 
negative skewness for participants‘ stress, concern, and perceived difficulty of the TSST 
confirms that the task induced a moderate degree of psychological stress as intended, thereby 
serving as a manipulation check.  
Reliability analyses of dependent and independent measures revealed a high degree of 
internal consistency for working memory (Cronbach‘s α = .87), pre-TSST distress (Cronbach‘s α 
= .94), post-TSST distress (Cronbach‘s α = .95), and distress at follow-up (Cronbach‘s α = .94), 
and an acceptable degree of internal consistency for visual analog scales (Cronbach‘s α = .62). 
Pearson correlations between working memory and emotional distress pre-TSST, post-TSST, 





Table 5. Pearson correlations between working memory and pre-TSST emotional distress 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. PASAT 1 
(2.6 s) 
--            
2. PASAT  2 
(2.4 s) 
.62*** --           
3. PASAT  3 
(2.0 s) 
.51*** .71*** --          
4. PASAT 4 
(1.6 s) 
.48*** .67*** .80*** --         
5. PASAT 
(Total) 
.75*** .86*** .90*** .89*** --        
6. POMS 
(Ang) 
.02 -.03 -.07 -.03 -.03 --       
7. POMS 
(Conf) 
.15 .10 .09 .12 .13 .60*** --      
8. POMS 
(Dep) 
.07 .01 -.04 .12 .02 .67*** .80*** --     
9. POMS  
(Fat) 
.02 .05 .03 .04 .04 .53*** .76*** .75*** --    
10. POMS 
(Ten) 
.02 .01 .01 .02 .02 .53*** .70*** .66*** .57*** --   
11. POMS 
(Vig) 
-.19* -.28** -.27** -.23* -.28** -.07 -.40*** -.30*** -.37*** -.30** --  
12. POMS 
(Total) 
.06 .04 .01 .05 .05 .77*** .88*** .92*** .84*** .79*** -.46*** -- 
 
Note. PASAT – Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task; POMS – Profile of Mood States; POMS (Ang) – Anger subscale; POMS (Conf) – Confusion 
subscale;  POMS (Dep) – Depression subscale; POMS (Fat) – Fatigue subscale; POMS (Ten) – Tension/anxiety subscale; POMS (Vig) – Vigor subscale 
(reverse scored); VA-I – Visual Analog, Involvement; VA-S – Visual Analog, Stress; VA-C – Visual Analog, Concern; VA-D – Visual Analog, 
Difficulty. 
 







Table 6. Pearson correlations between working memory and post-TSST emotional distress 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
1. PASAT 1 
(2.6 s) 
--                
2. PASAT  2 
(2.4 s) 
.62*** --               
3. PASAT  3 
(2.0 s) 
.51*** .71*** --              
4. PASAT 4 
(1.6 s) 
.48*** .67*** .80*** --             
5. PASAT 
(Total) 
.75*** .86*** .90*** .89*** --            
6. POMS 
(Ang) 
.19* .10 .23* .22* .23* --           
7. POMS 
(Conf) 
.24** .29** .31** .32*** .34*** .62*** --          
8. POMS 
(Dep) 
.33*** .24** .22* .22* .30** .75*** .79*** --         
9. POMS 
(Fat) 
.15 .19* .26** .22* .24** .63*** .75*** .79*** --        
10. POMS 
(Ten) 
.05 .12 .17 .16 .15 .62*** .77*** .66*** .64*** --       
11. POMS 
(Vig) 
-.21* -.31** -.39*** -.30** -.36*** -.19* -.39*** -.26** -.38*** -.29** --      
12. POMS 
(Total) 
.24* .25** .31** .29** .32** .82*** .89*** .90*** .86*** .83*** .46*** --     
13. VA-I -.01 -.08 -.23* -.25** -.18 -.07 -.23* -.06 -.11 .01 .20* -.11 --    
14.VA-S .25** .24** .28** .22* .29** .31** .38*** .28** .38*** .55*** .27** .45*** .15 --   
15.VA-C .22* .19* .17 .15 .21* .13 .25** .20* .12 .34*** -.07 .22* .09 .56*** --  
16. VA-D .33*** .41*** .44*** .40*** .46*** .22* .32*** .22* .30** .24** .32*** .34*** .01 .51*** .31** -- 
 
Note. PASAT – Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task; POMS – Profile of Mood States; POMS (Ang) – Anger subscale; POMS (Conf) – Confusion 
subscale;  POMS (Dep) – Depression subscale; POMS (Fat) – Fatigue subscale; POMS (Ten) – Tension/anxiety subscale; POMS (Vig) – Vigor subscale 
(reverse scored); VA-I – Visual Analog, Involvement; VA-S – Visual Analog, Stress; VA-C – Visual Analog, Concern; VA-D – Visual Analog, Difficulty. 
 






Table 7. Pearson correlations between working memory and emotional distress at follow-up 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. PASAT 1 (2.6 s) --            
2. PASAT  2 (2.4 s) .62*** --           
3. PASAT  3 (2.0 s) .51*** .71*** --          
4. PASAT 4 (1.6 s) .48*** .67*** .80*** --         
5. PASAT (Total) .75*** .86*** .90*** .89*** --        
6. POMS (Ang) .27** .12 .19* .12 .21* --       
7. POMS (Conf) .31** .27** .27** .22* .31** .58*** --      
8. POMS (Dep) .32** .17 .13 .11 .21* .67*** .77*** --     
9. POMS (Fat) .19* .19* .23* .15 .22* .53*** .76*** .70*** --    
10. POMS (Ten) .17 .14 .16 .11 .17 .58*** .74*** .71*** .62*** --   
11. POMS (Vig) -.22* -.30** -.31** -.21* -.30** -.14 -.42*** -.23** -.32*** -.29** --  
12. POMS (Total) .28** .23** .26** .19 .28** .70*** .89*** .87*** .83*** .81*** -.57*** -- 
 
Note. PASAT – Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task; POMS – Profile of Mood States; POMS (Ang) – Anger subscale; POMS (Conf) – Confusion 
subscale;  POMS (Dep) – Depression subscale; POMS (Fat) – Fatigue subscale; POMS (Ten) – Tension/anxiety subscale; POMS (Vig) – Vigor subscale 
(reverse scored); VA-I – Visual Analog, Involvement; VA-S – Visual Analog, Stress; VA-C – Visual Analog, Concern; VA-D – Visual Analog, Difficulty 
 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Aim 1: Working memory under stress 
Working memory by diagnosis. The mean number of total errors on the PASAT in the 
sample overall was 55.13 (SD = 30.44). Total PASAT errors were unrelated to age (r(112) = .14, 
p = .144), years of education (r(107) = -.13, p = .191), race (F(5,108) = 0.51, p = .765), or sex 
(F(1,112) = 0.32, p = .574). However, there was a modest inverse relationship between years of 
education and PASAT errors on the easiest trial (r(107) = -.19, p = .049). There were no 
significant differences across diagnostic groups in total PASAT errors (F(2,108) = 1.497, p = 
.228) and no group differences in errors on any of the four trials or in change scores. These 
findings did not support Hypothesis 1a, which predicted that BPD participants would show 
poorer working memory performance compared to MDD participants and controls. Hypothesis 
1b, which predicted that MDD participants would show significantly better working memory 
performance compared to BPD participants, was also not supported. PASAT errors by diagnostic 
group and for the total sample are presented in Table 8. Errors for each PASAT trial are 
presented for each diagnostic group in Figure 3. The impact of diagnosis on working memory is 






Table 8. Working memory errors by diagnostic group 
 
 BPD (n = 60) MDD (n = 30) Control (n = 21) Total (n = 111)  ANOVA 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)  F p 
PASAT  
(no. of errors) 
       
Trial 1 (2.6 s) 8.68 (9.07) 9.10 (8.07) 6.14 (8.17) 8.37 (8.50)  F(2,108) = 0.841 .434 
Trial 2 (2.4 s) 9.67 (7.27) 11.23 (6.20) 7.62 (5.95) 10.00 (7.18)  F(2,108) = 1.766 .176 
Trial 3(2.0 s) 15.03 (9.07) 15.98 (8.53) 11.48 (8.47) 14.89 (9.12)  F(2,108) = 1.760 .177 
Trial 4 (1.6 s) 21.32 (10.99) 23.33 (9.22) 19.83 (12.11) 21.86 (10.87)  F(2,108) = 0.692 .503 
Total score 54.70 (31.40) 59.65 (27.39) 45.07 (28.18) 55.13 (30.44)  F(2,108) = 1.497 .228 
Change scores 
(T4-T1) 
12.63 (10.05) 14.23 (8.04) 13.69 (12.42) 13.49 (10.08)  F(2,108) = 0.276 .759 
        
Note. PASAT – Paced Auditory Serial Addition Task 
 
















































Distress as proposed mediator. To test Hypothesis 1c, which predicted that the impact 
of diagnosis on working memory performance would be mediated by emotional distress, the 
causal steps approach outlined by Baron and Kenny (1986) was followed. According to the 
causal steps approach, mediation is established in four steps. In Step 1, an independent variable 
(X) is shown to significantly predict a dependent variable (Y) (X  Y). In Step 2, the 
independent variable (X) is shown to significantly predict a mediator (M) (X  M). In Step 3, 
the mediator is shown to significantly predict the dependent variable when the independent 
variable is controlled for (M|X  Y). Finally, in Step 4, the presence of the mediator results in 
the non-significance or reduction in magnitude of the relationship between the independent 
variable (X) and the dependent variable (Y) (X|M  Y).  
Diagnosis was entered as the independent variable (X). Due to the presence of more than 
two levels in the variable, the mediation analysis was performed twice using two contrast-coded 
variables for diagnosis (described in ―Method‖ section). The first mediation analysis was 
performed with the BPD-versus-control contrast variable as the independent variable and the 
BPD-versus-MDD contrast variable as a covariate, and the second analysis was performed with 
the BPD-versus-MDD variable as the independent variable and the BPD-versus-control variable 
as the covariate (Hayes & Preacher, 2013).  Post-TSST POMS scores (emotional distress) were 
used as the mediator (M) in the analysis, and total PASAT errors (working memory) were used 
as the dependent variable (Y). In the temporal sequence of this procedure, the proposed mediator 
of distress (M) was assessed after the working memory task was implemented (Y). However, the 
use of mediators which are measured after the dependent variable in temporal sequence is 
justified when the mediator is theoretically presumed to occur between the independent and 
dependent variables (Warner, 2013). 
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In Step 1 of the mediation model, the impact of diagnosis on working memory, ignoring 
the mediator of distress, was non-significant (R
2
 = .02, F(2,105) = 1.32, p = .273). This failed to 
support Hypothesis 1c, which predicted that the relationship between diagnosis and working 
memory would be mediated by emotional distress. On an exploratory basis, however, Steps 2 
through 4 of the mediation analysis were carried out to clarify the relationships among the other 
variables in the model. Step 2 showed that diagnosis significantly predicted distress (R
2
 = .16, 
F(2,105) = 10.62, p < .001). Further examination of the contrast-coded diagnosis variables 
revealed an effect for the BPD v. controls comparison (β = .45, t(104) = 3.84, p < .001), such that 
BPD participants had significantly higher emotional distress (M = 50.75, SD = 48.43) and 
controls had lower distress (M = 1.11, SD = 23.73) compared to the sample mean (M = 36.27,  
SD = 44.55). Step 3 showed that emotional distress, controlling for diagnosis, significantly 
predicted working memory (β = .38, t(103) = 3.77, p < .001). Step 4 showed that diagnosis, 
controlling for emotional distress, did not significantly predict working memory, either in the 
BPD v. controls comparison (β = .03, t(103) = 0.19, p = .847) or the BPD v. MDD comparison (β 








Aim 2: Impact of distress on working memory 
Relationship between distress and working memory. In the sample overall, there was a 
significant positive zero-order correlation between total PASAT errors and total POMS scores 
post-TSST (r(108) = .324, p = .001) and at follow-up (r(107) = .277, p = .004), but not pre-TSST 
(r(104) = .047, p = .634). This supported Hypothesis 2a, which predicted that higher levels of 
emotional distress post-TSST would be associated with greater number of errors on the working 
memory task. All post-TSST POMS subscales, with the exception of tension, were significantly 
correlated with total PASAT errors; the strongest association was found for vigor, which was 
negatively associated with PASAT errors (r(115) = -.38, p < .001).  
Total PASAT errors were also positively correlated with POMS change scores from pre-
TSST to post-TSST (r(98) = .420, p < .001) and negatively correlated with POMS change scores 
from post-TSST to follow-up (r(100) = -.199, p = .045). Zero-order correlations indicated that 
visual analog ratings of stress (r(116) = .287, p = .002), concern (r(116) = .210, p = .022), and 
difficulty (r(116) = .463, p < .001) associated with the psychological stress task were positively 
associated with total PASAT errors. This was not true for self-reports of involvement in the 
stress task (r(116) = -.181, p = .050).  
Emotional distress and working memory by diagnosis 
Simple correlations. The relationship between emotional distress and working memory 
was first examined by comparing Pearson correlation coefficients between these two variables 
within diagnostic groups. The relationship between emotional distress post-TSST and working 
memory errors was positive and significant among BPD participants (r(54) = .443, p = .001) but 
not among MDD participants (r(27) = .137, p = .480) or controls (r(17) = .282, p = .242). A 
similar pattern was observed at follow-up; the relationship between emotional distress and 
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working memory errors was again positive and significant for BPD participants (r(53) = .302, p 
= .025) but not for MDD participants (r(27) = .104, p = .607) or controls (r(18) = .375, p = .103). 
To compare the strength of these correlations obtained from within diagnostic groups, 
correlation coefficients were converted into z-scores using Fisher‘s r-to-z transformation. This 
test revealed that BPD participants did not show a stronger relationship between emotional 
distress and working memory than did MDD participants or controls. This was found post-TSST 
(BPD versus MDD, Z = 1.412, p = .158; BPD versus controls, Z = 0.652, p = .514) and at follow-
up (BPD versus MDD, Z = 0.863, p = .388; BPD versus controls, Z = -0.295, p = .768). This test 
failed to support Hypothesis 2b, which predicted that the relationship between post-TSST 
distress and working memory performance would be stronger for BPD participants than for 
healthy controls. 
Impact of distress on working memory. For the second test of Hypothesis 2b, which 
predicted that the relationship between post-TSST distress and working memory performance 
would be stronger for BPD participants than for healthy controls, we conducted a hierarchical 
multiple regression analysis. The regression model sought to determine whether diagnosis 
moderated the relationship between distress and working memory. In this process, variables were 
added sequentially to examine their unique ability to explain the variance in working memory. In 
Model 1, POMS scores pre-TSST (hereafter referred to as ―baseline emotional distress‖) were 
included as a covariate to control for the significantly higher scores among BPD and MDD 
participants compared to controls (F(2,97) = 11.694, p < .001). In Model 2, two effects-coded 
contrast variables were used to make diagnostic comparisons. The first contrast variable (BPD = 
1, MDD = 0, control = -1) compared BPD participants‘ and controls‘ PASAT errors against 
mean PASAT errors in the sample. The second contrast variable (BPD = 1, MDD = -1, control = 
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0) compared BPD participants‘ and MDD participants‘ PASAT errors against mean PASAT 
errors in the sample. The addition of diagnosis to the model did not improve explained variance 
in PASAT errors (ΔR
2
 = .017, p = .449) and diagnosis alone did not significantly predict PASAT 
errors (F(3,93) = 0.694, p = .558), even when controlling for baseline emotional distress. Thus, 
diagnosis alone did not appear to impact working memory performance.  
In Model 3, post-TSST POMS scores (hereafter referred to as ―emotional distress‖) were 
added to the model, in order to examine the impact of emotional distress and diagnosis together 
on working memory.  The addition of emotional distress significantly improved model fit (ΔR
2
 = 
.230, p < .001), and emotional distress by itself predicted working memory (β = .793, t(91) = 
5.317, p < .001) when controlling for baseline emotional distress. The addition of emotional 
distress also resulted in a main effect for diagnosis, such that the comparison of BPD 
participants‘ and MDD participants‘ PASAT errors against mean PASAT errors in the sample 
became significant (β = -.271, t(91) = -2.183, p = .032). This indicated that, after controlling for 
emotional distress at both time-points, BPD participants made significantly fewer errors on the 
PASAT (M = 54.70, SD = 31.40), while MDD participants showed greater errors (M = 59.65, SD 
= 27.39), compared to the mean number of errors in the sample (M = 55.13, SD = 30.44). The 
comparison of BPD participants‘ and controls‘ PASAT errors to mean PASAT errors in the 
sample was not significant (β = .114, t(97) = 0.851, p = .397), suggesting that BPD participants‘ 
working memory performance was not significantly different from that of controls.  
Finally, Model 4 tested the hypothesis that diagnosis would moderate the impact of 
emotional distress on working memory performance. Two multiplicative interaction terms 
(between centered POMS scores post-TSST and both diagnosis contrast variables) were added to 





 = .017, p = .356). Both interactions tested were non-significant: the impact of 
emotional distress on working memory was not significantly different for BPD participants or 
controls than it was for the sample overall (β = -.269, t(99) = -1.031, p = .305). Similarly, the 
impact of emotional distress on working memory was not significantly different for BPD 
participants or MDD participants than it was for the overall sample (β = .303, t(99) = 1.437, p = 
.154). Emotional distress by itself remained a significant predictor of working memory 
performance in this model (β = .758, t(99) = 3.539, p = .001). Diagnosis by itself was no longer a 
significant predictor of working memory in this model, either in the comparison of BPD 
participants and controls to overall PASAT errors (β = -.042, t(99) = -0.194, p = .847) or in the 
comparison of BPD and MDD participants to overall PASAT errors (β = -.169, t(99) = -1.065, p 





Table 9. The impact of emotional distress and diagnosis on working memory performance 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variable  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β 
(Covariate)
a
  0.05 0.73 .07  0.02 0.08 .03  -0.40*** 0.11 -.55  -0.36** 0.11 -.51 
BPD v. MDD      -6.12 5.01 -.17  -9.73* 4.46 -.27  -6.06 5.70 -.17 
BPD v. control      6.19 5.72 .16  4.29 5.05 .114  -1.60 8.25 -.04 
Distress
b 
         0.52*** 0.10 .793  0.50** 0.14 .758 
BPD v. MDD  
x distress 
 
            0.23 0.16 .30 
BPD v. control 
x distress 
 
            -0.20 0.20 -.27 
ΔR
2
  .005    .017    .230    .017   
F for ΔR
2
  0.47    0.81    28.27***    1.05   
Note. 
a
 POMS scores at baseline were entered as a covariate in all models. 
b
 Distress – POMS scores post-TSST 
 





In summary, emotional distress and diagnosis (BPD-versus-MDD) each significantly 
predicted working memory performance. However, there was no interaction between emotional 
distress and diagnosis in predicting working memory. That is, the impact of emotional distress on 
working memory did not appear to differ significantly by diagnosis.  
Impact of specific emotions on working memory. To determine which emotional state 
(i.e., POMS subscale) was the best predictor of working memory, an additional multiple 
regression analysis was conducted in which anger, confusion, depression, tension/anxiety, 
fatigue, and vigor were entered as predictors of PASAT errors. These findings are shown in 
Table 10. Confusion (β = .40, t(105) = 2.16, p = .033) positively predicted PASAT errors, while 
tension (β = -.29, t(105) = -2.04, p = .044) and vigor (β = -.30, t(105) = -3.13, p = .002) 
negatively predicted PASAT errors. Anger, depression, and fatigue did not significantly predict 
working memory. A stepwise multiple regression analysis was performed to determine which 
emotional states best predicted working memory. This analysis confirmed that confusion and 
vigor were the best predictors of working memory, such that confusion positively predicted 
PASAT errors (β = .23, t(109) = 2.49, p = .014) and vigor negatively predicted PASAT errors (β 
= -.27, t(105) = -2.88, p = .005). Tension no longer predicted working memory in this analysis, 





Table 10. Summary of simple regression analysis for specific predictors of working memory 
 
Variable B SE B β t p 
Anger 0.37 0.40 .12 0.92 .362 
Confusion 1.76 0.81 .40 2.16 .033* 
Depression 0.36 0.41 .15 0.88 .379 
Fatigue -0.77 0.62 -.19 -1.24 .217 
Tension -0.91 0.45 -.29 -2.04 .044* 
Vigor -1.19 0.38 -.30 -3.13 .002** 
R2  .22    
F  5.13***    





To determine whether the impact of confusion and vigor on working memory differed for 
diagnostic groups, the hierarchical multiple regression analysis described above was repeated; 
one analysis was conducted for confusion, and one analysis was conducted for vigor. In the first 
hierarchical regression, controlling for baseline levels of confusion, main effects were observed 
for post-TSST confusion and diagnosis. Confusion positively predicted working memory (β = 
.61, t(101) = 4.34, p < .001). Diagnosis predicted working memory, but only when controlling 
for confusion (β = -.27, t(101) = -2.13, p = .035). BPD participants made significantly fewer 
errors on the PASAT (M = 54.70, SD = 31.40) than did MDD participants (M = 59.65, SD = 
27.39) compared to the mean number of errors in the sample (M = 55.13, SD = 30.44). There was 
no interaction between confusion and diagnosis in predicting working memory. These findings 
are presented in Table 11.  
In the second hierarchical regression, controlling for baseline levels of vigor, a main 
effect for vigor but not diagnosis was observed. Vigor negatively predicted working memory 
errors (β = -.41, t(101) = -2.66, p = .009). There was no interaction between vigor and diagnosis 





Table 11. The impact of POMS confusion scores and diagnosis on working memory performance 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variable  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β 
(Covariate)
a
  0.81 0.54 .14  0.59 0.60 .10  -1.88 0.80 -.33*  -1.54 0.82 -.27 
BPD v. MDD      -5.45 4.72 -.15  -9.50 4.46 -.27*  -5.99 5.43 -.17 
BPD v. control      5.77 5.46 .15  5.68 5.04 .15  1.20 7.20 .03 
Confusion
b 
         2.68 0.62 .61***  2.31 0.79 .52** 
BPD v. MDD  
x confusion 
 
            1.45 .93 .29 
BPD v. control x 
confusion 
 
            -1.03 1.10 -.20 
ΔR
2
  .02    .01    .15    .02   
F for ΔR
2
  2.29    0.74    18.84***    1.31   
Note. 
a
 POMS confusion scores at baseline were entered as a covariate in all models. 
b
 Confusion – POMS confusion scores post-TSST 
 








Table 12. The impact of POMS vigor scores and diagnosis on working memory performance 
 
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Variable  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β  B SE B β 
(Covariate)
a
  -1.07 0.36 -.28**  -1.01 0.39 -.26*  0.27 0.61 .07  0.27 0.62 .07 
BPD v. MDD      -4.54 4.45 -.13  -4.20 4.32 -.12  -4.30 4.48 -.12 
BPD v. control      3.10 5.12 .08  3.05 4.50 .08  3.00 5.31 .08 
Vigor
b 
         -1.61 0.60 -.41**  -1.61 0.62 -.41* 
BPD v. MDD  
x vigor 
             -0.13 0.54 -.03 
BPD v. control 
x vigor 
             0.03 0.57 .01 
ΔR
2
  .08    .01    .06    .001   
F for ΔR
2
  8.77**    0.53    7.08**    0.04   
Note. 
a
 POMS vigor scores at baseline were entered as a covariate in all models. 
b
 Vigor – POMS vigor scores post-TSST 
 







The primary aims of this study were to investigate the impact of emotional distress on 
working memory performance and to determine whether emotion-induced working memory 
disruption was stronger for BPD participants than for MDD participants or healthy controls. This 
was examined in the context of a psychological stress procedure, in which participants were 
asked to give a short speech and perform rapid mental arithmetic calculations in front of study 
confederates. Participants completed subjective ratings of distress before, immediately following, 
and at follow-up after the stress procedure. The number of errors on the arithmetic task 
performed during the stress procedure was used to assess participants‘ working memory 
performance. Broadly speaking, this study aimed to assess the extent to which individuals with 
BPD may be more vulnerable to cognitive interference from intense emotional experiences, 
particularly those generated by negative evaluation fears and hypersensitivity to rejection. This 
section will review and interpret key findings.  
Demographic characteristics 
 Participants in the current sample were predominantly female and highly educated, and 
the majority of participants identified as white. Approximately half the participants were 
employed, although one-third of unemployed participants were students. The fact that the sample 
was highly educated (most had completed some college) likely reflects the population 
surrounding a university teaching hospital in an urban setting. Greater educational attainment 
may also have been made more likely by the fact that many clinical participants were referred by 
mental health or medical providers, and were therefore receiving effective management of their 
psychiatric symptoms. Despite the high level of education in the sample overall, it was not 
 
58 
controlled for in the current study because educational attainment did not differ significantly 
across diagnostic groups. The fact that the current sample was predominantly female is 
consistent with the higher prevalence of BPD among women found in previous research (DSM-
IV-TR, 2000; Sansone & Sansone, 2011; Skodol & Bender, 2003). 
Clinical characteristics 
 Analyses revealed significant clinical differences at baseline between BPD and MDD 
participants in the sample. BPD participants had a higher degree of comorbidity with other 
psychiatric disorders than did MDD participants, and were more likely to carry three or more 
Axis I diagnoses. This is consistent with the higher prevalence of Axis I comorbidity in BPD 
than in MDD found in previous studies (Zanarini et al., 1998; Zimmerman & Mattia, 1999). 
Compared to MDD participants, BPD participants in this sample were also more likely to have 
had a history of self-injurious behavior, and showed higher levels of aggression and impulsivity. 
In addition, BPD participants demonstrated lower psychosocial functioning and greater overall 
psychiatric symptoms than did MDD participants. These findings suggest that the participants 
with BPD were more severely ill than those with MDD in a number of areas. The high 
prevalence of comorbid current depression (50%) and lifetime depression (45%) among the BPD 
patients in this sample, a rate consistent with previous estimates (e.g., McGlashan et al., 2000), 
indicates further that this was a particularly ill sample. Indeed, co-occurring BPD and MDD have 
been shown to relate to poorer clinical outcomes (Gunderson et al., 2004) and greater likelihood 
of suicide attempts and completions (Corbitt, Malone, Haas, & Mann, 1996; Soloff, Lynch, 
Kelly, Malone, & Mann, 2000). It is notable that BPD and MDD participants did not differ in 
their reported degree of hopelessness, since previous studies comparing these groups have found 
greater hopelessness in BPD (Fertuck et al., 2006b). However, the parent study from which this 
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sample was drawn recruited equal numbers of suicide attempters in the BPD and MDD groups. 
Given that hopelessness is known to be a strong predictor of suicidality (Beck, 2006; Beck, 
Steer, Kovacs, & Garrison, 1985; Mann, 2002), this may have accounted for the equivalent 
degree of hopelessness between the two groups. 
BPD participants also had higher levels of depression and anxiety than did MDD 
participants, though findings varied depending on the measures that were used to assess these 
symptoms. BPD participants showed significantly higher scores on the HAM-D (24-item 
version), a clinician-rated measure that assesses neurovegetative, behavioral, cognitive, and 
motivational domains of depression. In contrast, BPD participants‘ elevation in scores on the 
BDI-II – an instrument which emphasizes cognitive symptoms of depression – was not 
significant. This suggests that, despite the high prevalence of current or lifetime diagnoses of 
depression within the BPD group in this sample, individuals with BPD versus MDD may 
experience different qualitative features of depression. For example, depression in BPD is more 
likely to be characterized by mood reactivity and interpersonal sensitivity than in MDD (Fertuck 
et al., 2006; Feske et al., 2004; Joyce et al., 2003). These domains are more likely to be probed 
by the HAM-D than the BDI.  
For anxiety, the opposite pattern in measures was found. BPD participants scored higher 
on the STAI, a self-report measure of current distress, but not the HAM-A, a clinician-rated 
measure of psychological and somatic symptoms of anxiety in the past week. BPD participants 
may have rated themselves as being in greater momentary distress in part due to the pervasive 
and intense negative affectivity that characterizes the disorder (Stiglmayr et al., 2001; Zanarini et 
al., 1998). In addition, some researchers have noted that the HAM-A does not reliably 
distinguish between generalized anxiety disorder and depression (Koerner, Antony, & Dugas, 
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2010; Roemer, 2001). Given the overlap in the measurement of cognitive and affective 
symptoms between the HAM-A and BDI, it is perhaps not surprising that the equivalence of 
BPD and MDD participants was consistent across these measures.  
Aim 1: Working memory under stress 
Working memory by diagnosis. Working memory performance in the sample was 
unrelated to age, years of education, race, or sex. Research examining age differences in working 
memory performance on the PASAT has been inconclusive. Some studies have demonstrated 
that older age is associated with poorer working memory performance (Brittain, LaMarche, 
Reeder, Roth, & Boll, 1991; Diehr et al., 2003), while others have found that older participants 
actually perform better than their younger counterparts (Ward, 1997). In part, these contradictory 
findings could be attributable to different cognitive strengths across the life span. Working 
memory performance might be superior in younger individuals, but older individuals could have 
greater familiarity and ease with routine mathematical calculations (Tombaugh, 2006). 
Moreover, the oldest participant in this sample was only 57, making it less likely to detect 
significant age-related deterioration in working memory.    
Research on sex differences in PASAT performance has yielded more consistent 
findings, with most studies showing no significant differences by sex (Diehr et al., 2003; 
MacLeod & Prior, 1996; Wingenfeld, Holdwick, Davis, & Hunter, 1999). Thus, the finding that 
PASAT performance was unrelated to sex in this sample is consistent with this body of literature. 
However, in contrast to the finding that overall PASAT performance was unrelated to education, 
many studies have documented a relationship between greater education and superior PASAT 
performance (e.g., Brittain et al., 1991; Diehr, Heaton, Miller, & Grant, 1998; Wiens, Fuller, & 
Crossen, 1997). Greater education was slightly associated with fewer PASAT errors on the 
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easiest trial of the task in our sample.  However, previous research examining demographic 
differences in PASAT performance has been performed in healthy samples, and has not 
examined performance on the PASAT when administered under stressful conditions. It is 
therefore difficult to clarify the precise nature of the relationship between education and working 
memory in this sample. Participants‘ high degree of stress while taking the PASAT could have 
obscured the impact of other demographic variables. Studies examining the relationship between 
race and PASAT performance have yielded inconclusive results (Brittain et al., 1991; Diehr et 
al., 1998; Wiens et al, 1997).  
Contrary to Hypotheses 1a and 1b, no differences were observed between BPD 
participants, MDD participants, and controls in working memory performance on the PASAT, 
both in total number of errors, in individual performance on each trial, and in change scores (i.e., 
degree of deterioration) from Trial 1 to Trial 4. However, when emotional distress was controlled 
in subsequent analyses, superior working memory performance was observed among BPD 
participants compared to MDD participants. Put another way, BPD participants would show 
better working memory performance, and MDD participants poorer performance, if both groups 
were equally distressed. Given the complex relationship between diagnosis and distress in 
predicting working memory performance, these findings are discussed further in the ―Impact of 
distress on working memory‖ section of this chapter.  
Distress as proposed mediator. Contrary to Hypothesis 1c, the impact of diagnosis on 
working memory was not mediated by emotional distress because a simple relationship between 
diagnosis and working memory (i.e., Step 1 of the causal steps approach to mediation; Baron & 
Kenny, 1986) was not found. Mediational analyses are sensitive to small sample sizes which 
contribute to lack of statistical power (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007). In the current study, unequal 
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sample sizes may have contributed to this statistical underpowering. Moreover, in traditional 
meditational analyses, mediators are variables which occur in temporal sequence between the 
occurrence of the independent and dependent variables. The mediator assessed in the current 
study (i.e., distress) was measured following the dependent variable (i.e., working memory). 
Although this was justified because distress was theoretically presumed to occur before the 
working memory task took place, it was nonetheless a limitation of the analysis. These findings 
are discussed further in the ―Impact of distress on working memory‖ section of this chapter.  
Aim 2: Impact of distress on working memory 
Relationship between distress and working memory. Emotional distress immediately 
following the stress task and at follow-up was positively correlated with working memory errors 
in the sample overall. It is noteworthy that there was no relationship between baseline emotional 
distress and working memory, and that this relationship only emerged after the onset of the 
stressor. Of the six POMS subscales, vigor was most strongly associated with working memory, 
such that it was negatively correlated with working memory errors. Participant ratings of stress, 
concern about their performance, and perceived difficulty of the task were also positively 
associated with working memory errors. In addition, working memory errors were positively 
correlated with distress change scores from pre-TSST to post-TSST, and negatively correlated 
with distress change scores from post-TSST to follow-up. That is, greater increases in distress 
were associated with poorer working memory performance in the sample, while more 
pronounced decreases in distress after the TSST (i.e., a fuller return to baseline) were associated 
with superior working memory performance.  
This finding helps to shed light not only on the rises in distress that were associated with 
poorer cognitive functioning, but on the effect of the post-task regulation period. One would 
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expect that the gradual reduction in emotional distress following a stressful experience would 
occur more slowly for individuals with BPD, given the slower return to baseline that is 
considered a hallmark of their emotional reactivity (Linehan, 1993; Herpertz, 2003). Although it 
was beyond the scope of the current study to compare the magnitude of change in POMS scores 
across diagnostic groups, future studies should seek to determine whether changes in distress are 
more strongly associated with working memory in BPD compared to MDD or healthy controls.  
Relationship between distress and working memory by diagnosis. Exploratory 
correlational analyses revealed that working memory errors and emotional distress post-TSST 
and at follow-up and were positively associated for BPD participants, but not for MDD 
participants or controls, when the groups were analyzed separately. However, when the strength 
of correlation coefficients were compared across the three groups, the correlations found 
between distress and working memory were not significantly different. That is, the relationship 
between distress and working memory did not appear to be stronger for BPD participants than 
for MDD participants or controls.   
Impact of distress on working memory. Controlling for baseline emotional distress 
(which was significantly higher in BPD and MDD participants compared to controls), emotional 
distress post-TSST was found to be a strong predictor of working memory performance in the 
sample overall. Diagnosis alone did not predict working memory performance, even when 
controlling for baseline emotional distress. However, controlling for post-TSST emotional 
distress resulted in superior working memory performance for BPD participants and poorer 
performance for MDD participants when compared to the overall sample. Controlling for post-
TSST emotional distress did not reveal significant differences in working memory for BPD 
participants compared to controls, indicating that distress had a unique impact on working 
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memory in the clinical groups but not in the control group. No interaction between distress and 
diagnosis was observed in predicting working memory; that is, the deleterious impact of distress 
on working memory performance did not appear to be greater for BPD participants than for 
MDD participants or controls. Contrary to the predictions made for the mediation analysis, in 
which it was anticipated that distress would mediate the relationship between diagnosis and 
working memory, it appears as though distress acted as a suppressor in the relationship between 
diagnosis and distress, such that its large impact on cognitive performance had to be statistically 
controlled before any group differences in working memory were found. This finding is 
discussed further in the ―General discussion‖ section of this chapter.  
Impact of specific emotions on working memory. To further explore the finding that 
post-TSST total POMS scores predicted working memory, multiple regression analyses were 
conducted to determine which emotional states (i.e., POMS subscale) accounted for this 
relationship. POMS subscales included tension/anxiety, depression/dejection, anger/hostility, 
confusion/bewilderment, fatigue/inertia, and vigor/activity.  Of the six emotional states assessed 
by the POMS, confusion and vigor were the strongest predictors of working memory 
performance, such that confusion positively predicted errors and vigor negatively predicted 
errors. BPD participants again showed superior working memory performance, and MDD 
participants poorer performance, when confusion was controlled for. However, the same was not 
true for vigor; controlling for vigor did not result in superior performance for BPD participants 
and poorer performance for MDD participants. This suggests that working memory performance 
was roughly the same across groups when all participants were equally invigorated, but that 
when the groups were equally confused, BPD participants performed better on the working 
memory measure. It is noteworthy that different relationships between diagnosis and working 
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memory were found for positively valenced versus negatively valenced emotional states. BPD 
participants appeared to show better performance when equally as confused, but not when 
equally invigorated. Negative emotional states may be more salient for BPD participants than for 
MDD participants, and in some cases may actually spur motivation that improves performance. 
This finding is consistent with a previous study indicating that negative affective states predict 
greater impulse control for individuals with BPD traits compared to those without BPD traits 
(Chapman, Leung, & Lynch, 2008), which has been theorized to relate to harm avoidance traits 
in BPD (Ball et al., 1997). 
General discussion 
The results of this study and others (Fertuck et al., 2006b; Sprock et al., 2000) suggest 
that the role of emotional distress may be critical when evaluating neurocognitive functioning in 
BPD individuals compared to controls and other psychiatric populations. Ignoring the impact of 
distress, there were no basic neurocognitive differences between BPD participants, MDD 
participants, and controls in this sample. This is consistent with a large body of literature, though 
findings on neurocognitive differences between BPD participants and other groups have been 
equivocal. For instance, numerous studies comparing BPD participants to healthy controls on 
neurocognitive measures have found no differences in various domains, such as working 
memory and attention (Dinn et al., 2004; Fertuck et al., 2006b; Kunert et al., 2003; Sprock et al., 
2000), learning and memory (Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Fertuck et al., 2006b; 
Bazanis et al., 2002; Kunert et al., 2003), language abilities (Cornelius et al., 1989), intelligence 
(Fertuck et al., 2006b; Kunert et al., 2003), motor abilities (Cornelius et al., 1989; Fertuck et al., 
2006b), visuospatial abilities (Cornelius et al., 1989), processing speed (Fertuck et al., 2006b), 
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and executive functioning (Fertuck et al., 2006b; Kunert et al., 2003; LeGris et al., 2012; Sprock 
et al., 2000). 
However, other studies examining neurocognitive differences between individuals with 
BPD and healthy controls have shown deficits consistent with frontal lobe dysfunction in BPD, 
such as attention, memory, executive functioning, processing speed, and visuospatial abilities 
(Posner et al., 2002; Lenzenweger et al., 2004; Ruocco & Trobst, 2003; Tebartz van Elst et al., 
2003). Indeed, a meta-analysis determined that there was a mean effect size in the moderate 
range for attention (a constituent component of working memory) across 10 studies comparing 
neurocognitive performance in BPD and control groups (Ruocco, 2005). However, the 
neurocognitive deficits that have been found in BPD are often similar to those found in MDD 
(Veiel, 1997; Zakzanis et al., 1998), making it difficult to determine whether their 
neurocognitive profiles are distinct. In addition, Fertuck et al. (2006a) noted that studies which 
have not found neurocognitive differences between BPD and control groups were more 
methodologically rigorous than studies detecting significant differences. For example, studies 
which did not find differences tended to control for the confounding influence of other variables, 
such as IQ. 
One possible explanation for the lack of consensus in this area is that very few studies 
have accounted for the role of distress in neuropsychological functioning in BPD, given that 
cognitive performance in BPD may owe more to the impact of transient mood states than to 
underlying cognitive deficits per se. As discussed in Chapter I, Fertuck et al. (2006b) 
incorporated distress ratings in their neurocognitive comparisons of depressed participants with 
and without BPD, and found that controlling for anxiety resulted in superior neurocognitive 
performance for the BPD group in several domains (attention, psychomotor speed, and general 
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IQ). This is strikingly consistent with the current finding that controlling for distress revealed 
superior working memory performance for BPD participants and poorer working memory 
performance for MDD participants, although there were some slight differences. For example, 
vigor (in an inverse relationship) was the strongest POMS predictor of working memory in our 
sample, whereas the Fertuck et al. (2006b) study implicated the tension/anxiety subscale. Their 
study also assessed multiple neurocognitive domains and found that higher-order cognitive 
functions, such as working memory, were not affected by controlling for tension. Attention is a 
necessary functional component of working memory, but working memory is a more complex 
process that also requires short-term manipulation and retrieval of information to produce a 
desired outcome.  
It is noteworthy that in the current study, testing participants‘ working memory 
performance under stressful conditions – a study design in which distress was ‗built in‘ to the 
working memory task – was not sufficient to account for the impact of distress in its entirety. 
Statistical controls were required to equalize levels of distress across groups, thereby allowing 
neurocognitive differences to emerge. In light of Fertuck et al.‘s (2006b) finding that controlling 
for anxiety revealed superior performance in BPD, it is more likely that simple differences in 
working memory performance would have been found in this sample had distress levels been 
comparable across clinical groups. Had levels of distress been roughly equivalent across 
diagnostic groups, one would not have needed to control for them statistically. Therefore, one 
can infer that levels of distress must have differed significantly across diagnostic groups. Given 
that baseline distress was greater among BPD and MDD participants compared to controls, but 
not significantly different between BPD and MDD groups, it is reasonable to surmise that 
differences in distress between the two clinical groups emerged post-TSST, indicating unique 
 
68 
stress responses in BPD compared to MDD. Comparing post-TSST levels of distress across the 
diagnostic groups was beyond the scope of this study, but future research should aim to clarify 
the degree and type of distress experienced by BPD participants compared to MDD participants 
and controls.  
In light of the fact that major depression is associated with impairments in attention 
(Gorlyn et al., 2006) – a constituent component of working memory – it is noteworthy that the 
BPD group in the current sample had higher levels of clinician-rated depression than the MDD 
group, yet outperformed the MDD group when all participants were equally distressed. Fertuck 
et al. (2006b) previously commented on this phenomenon and suggested that ―depression-like 
deficits in BPD participants may be more closely related to characteristic mood fluctuations than 
to the effects of depression per se‖ (p. 65). The findings of the current study may indicate that 
emotional reactivity or mood fluctuations are more important than inherent deficits in accounting 
for neurocognitive performance in BPD, particularly in light of the fact that clear neurocognitive 
impairments have not emerged in the literature.   
The poorer working memory performance observed in the MDD group could also be 
accounted for by differing presentations of depressive symptoms between the two groups. A 
number of researchers have noted qualitative differences in the nature of depressive symptoms 
experienced by individuals with BPD and MDD. For instance, depression in BPD is more likely 
to be characterized by mood reactivity and interpersonal sensitivity than in MDD (Fertuck et al., 
2006b; Stanley & Wilson, 2006). In contrast, depressed individuals with MDD are more likely 
than those with BPD to have melancholic features (Bellodi, Battaglia, Gasperni, Scherillo, & 
Brancato, 1992), a symptom cluster which includes anhedonia and lack of mood reactivity. 
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Melancholic features of depression are also commonly associated with cognitive deficits (Austin 
et al., 1999), which may help to explain the MDD group‘s poorer performance.  
In addition, psychologists have long speculated that the relationship between anxiety and 
performance is curvilinear, wherein increasing anxiety improves performance until a tipping 
point occurs and continued elevations in anxiety result in deteriorated performance (Yerkes & 
Dodson, 1908). This relationship has been empirically supported through the examination of 
cortisol. Mildly elevated glucocorticoid levels are associated with optimal consolidation of long-
term memories, but excessive glucocorticoid levels impair this process (Diamond, Campbell, 
Park, Halonen, & Zoladz, 2007). Lack of mood reactivity in the MDD group, along with 
characteristic features of anhedonia and amotivation, could mean that these individuals are less 
likely to experience the beneficial effects of mild stress on performance. Thus, depressive 
symptoms – particularly the melancholic type – may have a more disabling impact in 
uncomplicated MDD than in BPD. The MDD participants in this sample could also have had 
more difficulty inhibiting their attention to negative emotions experienced during the stress 
procedure. Individuals with MDD have been shown to orient their attention excessively toward 
negative emotional cues (Elliot et al., 2011; Rinck & Becker, 2005) and to show better recall of 
information related to negative emotions (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 1996; Bradley, Mogg, & 
Williams, 1995; Direnfeld & Roberts, 2006; Gotlib et al., 2004).  
It is also possible that the superior performance observed for BPD participants does not 
represent a deficit in the MDD group, but rather a relative strength in the BPD group. While 
BPD is a disorder associated with a wide range of functional impairments, individuals with the 
disorder have been shown to demonstrate particular strengths compared to controls in certain key 
areas. Most notable among these findings is research demonstrating that individuals with BPD 
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may have superior theory of mind or empathic capacities (Franzen et al., 2011; Gardner et al., 
2010; Lynch et al., 2006; Merkl et al., 2010; Wagner & Linehan, 1999) despite their high degree 
of interpersonal dysfunction (Stanley & Siever, 2010). This has been termed the ―borderline 
empathy‖ paradox (Dinsdale & Crespi, 2013; Krohn, 1974). Researchers have only recently 
begun to account for this paradox conceptually (Fertuck et al., 2009). BPD individuals‘ enhanced 
sensitivity to the mental states of others may be related to their hypervigilance for threats and 
signs of danger (Sieswarda, Arntz, Mertens, & Vertommen, 2007; Arntz et al., 2000), 
particularly in terms of anticipated social rejection and abandonment (Ayduk et al., 2008). This 
hypervigilance may be associated with heightened activity in the amygdala of individuals with 
BPD, resulting in attribution of negative or hostile intent when processing neutral facial stimuli 
(Donegan et al., 2003; Minzenberg et al., 2007).  
In light of the current study‘s finding that BPD participants outperformed MDD 
participants when equivalently distressed, it may be that BPD individuals‘ greater attentiveness 
to their environments confers an advantage when a performance-based task coincides with 
neutral interpersonal stimuli (i.e., study confederates‘ neutral affect), mobilizing even greater 
attentiveness and vigilance. This could also help to explain why vigor was the best predictor of 
working memory performance in the current sample: BPD participants‘ attention – and therefore 
working memory – may have been activated and improved by the interpersonally stressful nature 
of the task. In addition, sex differences in theory of mind have been observed, with females 
being noted to hold an advantage in this domain (i.e., Geary, 2010). Given the preponderance of 
female participants in this sample, it is possible that participants in the current study were 
particularly attentive to social cues in the testing environment.  
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Superior working memory performance alongside heightened distress among BPD 
individuals may also pertain to a phenomenon known as ‗apparent competence‘ (Linehan, 1993). 
This is a clinical presentation in which individuals with BPD may appear outwardly to be 
competent, while experiencing intense inner distress and turmoil. It also refers to the ability of 
BPD individuals to show effective coping skills in circumscribed and structured situations, but to 
‗fall apart‘ when structure is diminished or when circumstances change.  
Of course, greater attunement and sensitivity to the mental states of others may also play 
a key role in impaired interpersonal functioning in BPD. Individuals with BPD may be more 
accurate in categorizing others‘ mental states, but also show biased attributions of hostile intent 
based on their anticipation of abandonment and rejection (Ayduk et al., 2008). Further, they may 
show greater rigidity in clinging to these negative interpretations of others‘ intentions and are 
unable to alter or adjust these appraisals by incorporating new information, resulting in distorted 
perceptions of others (Fertuck et al., 2009). This complex interpersonal process may help to 
account for the ‗borderline empathy paradox.‘   
In addition, given their greater emotional sensitivity in a variety of situations, BPD 
participants may be more accustomed to the routine experience of stress and may be more 
habituated or acclimated to the experience of stress than individuals with uncomplicated 
depression. In situations where the degree of distress is equivalent across both groups (as in our 
statistical control of this variable), the impact of distress on cognitive performance may therefore 





Strengths and limitations 
This study used an experimentally manipulated, in-vivo social stressor to measure 
working memory capacities under stress. Experimental manipulations allow for a high degree of 
precision and internal validity, making it possible to pinpoint ostensible causes for participants‘ 
rise in distress after the stress procedure – the TSST is known to elevate stress because it raises 
concerns about negative social evaluation, and because it is experienced as uncontrollable by 
participants (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004; Gruenewald et al., 2004).  In the existing literature, 
moreover, there has been insufficient attention devoted to the impact of comorbid depression on 
neuropsychological performance in BPD. By assessing for the prevalence of depression and by 
including groups of BPD and MDD-only participants, the current study was able to identify key 
differences in these populations.  
 This study had several limitations. First, sample sizes in the MDD and control groups 
were relatively small, limiting statistical power and increasing the likelihood of making a Type II 
error. Moreover, the sample size of the BPD group was approximately three times larger than the 
MDD or control groups. Unequal sample sizes in regression analyses with categorical predictors 
can reduce the likelihood of independence of predictors (Keppel & Wickens, 2004), violating 
one of the traditional assumptions of linear regression. However, the independence of variances 
among the predictor variables in this study helps to alleviate this concern. Second, laboratory 
findings are often limited in generalizability. The TSST was a highly controlled procedure in 
which the stressor was circumscribed and time-limited, and the demands of the task were 
relatively known and quantifiable. In addition, the fact that the sample in the current study was 
highly educated, predominantly female, and predominantly white may limit the generalizability 
of these findings. Generalizability is limited further by the fact that participants were excluded 
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from analysis if they stopped performing the working memory task. Analyses revealed that these 
participants had higher levels of baseline anxiety than those who completed the task, suggesting 
that this was a more severely ill group. Thus, the results of the current study may generalize 
more appropriately to clinical populations that are mildly to moderately ill.  
 Third, interpreting results of the PASAT administered under stressful conditions is made 
difficult by the fact that the PASAT was not normed in this manner. As discussed in Chapter II, 
the PASAT was originally designed as a neuropsychological measure of working memory and 
was only later developed for use as a laboratory stressor. This was the first study to combine both 
uses of the PASAT and to treat the measure as a dependent variable in order to examine working 
memory performance under stress. In addition, the PASAT was not normed in clinical 
populations and is actually contraindicated for use as a neuropsychological assessment in clinical 
populations, due to its difficult and highly aversive nature (Tombaugh, 2006). Although it was 
inferred that emotional distress impacted working memory, moreover, the fact that working 
memory was not tested before and after the stress procedure limits our ability to draw this 
conclusion. Additionally, no other measures of working memory were used in this study to 
assess this ability.  
The PASAT has also been subjected to a number of revisions in different studies, such 
that the number of items and length of ISIs have varied. For these reasons, it is difficult to 
interpret the high degree of variance found in PASAT scores in this study, although previous 
studies have found wider variances in neuropsychological measures among BPD participants 
than among controls (Beblo et al., 2006). The wide range of PASAT scores could also have 
obscured additional meaningful differences across diagnostic groups, and could have washed out 
a statistical interaction between diagnosis and distress in predicting working memory. Large 
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variances in PASAT scores could be due to great individual differences in general working 
memory ability. Given working memory‘s association with IQ (e.g., Salthouse & Pink, 2008), it 
would have been helpful to know whether there was a wide range of intellectual abilities in this 
sample, and whether intelligence varied systematically across diagnoses.  
Conclusions 
This study was the first to directly measure BPD individuals‘ working memory capacities 
under stressful conditions using an experimentally manipulated, in-vivo social stressor. Findings 
revealed no neurocognitive deficits for BPD participants, and instead found that controlling for 
participants‘ distress revealed superior performance for BPD participants and poorer 
performance for MDD participants. These findings underscore the need to account for emotional 
distress when examining working memory in BPD and MDD groups. Mood fluctuations and 
emotional reactivity may play a larger role than pathophysiological factors in characterizing 
neurocognitive performance in these groups. These findings also underscore potential 
phenomenological differences in the presentation of depression in BPD compared to MDD, even 
when both groups self-report equivalent severity of symptoms (as was found in the current 
study). In addition, BPD individuals‘ greater attunement and sensitivity to others‘ emotional 
states may paradoxically confer an advantage when pure attentiveness and concentration are 
called for.  
Future directions 
Although it was beyond the scope of the current study to compare the magnitude of 
change in distress scores across diagnostic groups, future studies should seek to determine 
whether changes in distress are more strongly associated with working memory performance in 
BPD compared to MDD or healthy controls. Research in this area should also examine the 
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magnitude of change in working memory before and after stressful procedures, as well as 
changes across working memory trials of varying difficulty. Biological features of stress 
response, such as cortisol and heart rate, should also be examined for their ability to predict 
neurocognitive performance under stress. In addition, future research should aim to clarify the 
degree and type of distress experienced by BPD participants compared to MDD participants and 
controls. Different types of triggers may result in differing patterns of dysregulation among 
individuals with BPD, and future research should aim to identify such patterns. Future research 
should identify other circumstances in which heightened sensitivity is advantageous to 
individuals with BPD, and should continue to develop theoretical models (e.g., Fertuck et al., 
2009) of the complex ways in which interpersonal sensitivity both helps and hinders relational 
functioning in this population.  
Identifying correlates and predictors of treatment outcome among individuals with BPD 
is of critical importance, given the traditionally high dropout rate in this population (McMurran, 
Huband, & Overton, 2010) and the development of psychosocial treatment models like DBT 
which were specifically designed to target attrition, as well as therapist burnout (Linehan, 1993). 
Interestingly, greater executive control and visual memory have been noted to predict treatment 
completion in BPD (Fertuck et al., 2011). This finding points to the critical role of patients‘ 
executive functioning in enabling them to make non-impulsive treatment decisions that are 
guided by sound reasoning rather than transient emotional states. Future research should also aim 
to identify psychological and neurocognitive strengths among individuals with BPD. Given the 
equivocal and complex findings on neurocognitive performance in BPD to date, more research is 
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